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This project evaluates a conundrum facing those making and implementing foreign policies in 
the U.S. government and elsewhere, whether, in devising policies to address complex security 
crises, to focus on comprehensive programs that influence the fundamental drivers of conflict 
(root causes) or to pursue a more limited strategy that seeks to respond to the symptoms of 
violence. It explicitly focuses on the twin issues of when and why the policy community may 
take one approach over the other, and what tradeoffs the chosen strategy then creates. The 
project explores these issues by analyzing the dynamics in a particular subset of policies: 
mediation strategies employed by third party interveners in violent civil conflict. The project 
assesses the choices and consequences of different strategies for conflict mediation as a 
microcosm for debates over whether those responding to conflict should focus their efforts on 
addressing the fundamental drivers of conflict or the symptoms of conflict once it occurs. 
The analysis aims to extract insight into the effects of different approaches to conflict 
resolution and intervention, with the goal of helping to inform policy decisions across the range 
of programs and agencies that address issues of African security. The case first analyzes the 
strategies adopted by third-party mediators responding to the Burundian civil war, identifying 
when they attempted to address root causes as opposed to seeking to halt violence and addressing 
the immediate symptoms of conflict. Second, the paper investigates how these strategies affected 
the course of the conflict and the outcomes of their mediation efforts. This paper lays out the 
consequences of the choices made by mediators on the process of peace negotiations in Burundi, 
explicitly comparing across various attempts to resolve the Burundian civil war.  
 The lessons of the Burundi case suggest that fundamental issues must be addressed if a 
conflict is to be fully resolved, rather than managed. Delaying the resolution of root causes until 
after peacemakers have exited the situation can enable powerful groups to avoid addressing the 
issues.  After the peacemaking and negotiations process ends, there is less international attention 
and pressure, so the ability to perpetuate the status quo is enhanced. The difficulty is that the 
issues that fomented conflict in the first place may prove too sensitive to be introduced into 
negotiations when the conflict is either ongoing or very recent.  
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 The Burundian case shows that core issues may still be addressed by subsequent 
processes even if they are excluded from the negotiations process. However once domestic peace 
processes supplant third party interventions, addressing root causes is likely to take a lot longer 
when the core issues are not even opened during the third-party facilitated negotiations phase. 
Eliminating consideration of key root causes might be necessary for peace negotiations to 
proceed, but this choice often delays the attainment of a fully consolidated peace settlement. In 
Burundi, multiple side-negotiations processes were created to deal with some of these 
fundamental issues. Militant groups maintained a state of war while those parallel processes were 
ongoing, extending the duration of the conflict.  
 Ultimately those crafting and implementing conflict response strategies are left with a 
sensitive tradeoff: including extremely sensitive core issues may prevent progress in peace talks, 
but excluding those issues and focusing on process and conflict management creates a peace 
process with significant defects. There may be no right or wrong approach; it may just be a 
matter of which tradeoff is the necessary one to eventually get to a peaceful outcome. These 
defects may be addressed through follow-on negotiations, which prevent them from completely 
derailing the peace process. The tradeoff may prolong some aspects of the conflict, though if not 
addressed at all, in the worst cases excluding root causes could eventually lead to re-
militarization as groups attempt to resolve the fundamental problems.  
The analysis suggests that policy responses to conflict that focus on the short-term 
requirements for conflict cessation will merely contain a conflict rather than truly settle it. If the 
fundamental issues that drive conflict are left unresolved, then in the longer term conflict is 
likely to break out repeatedly.  The U.S. foreign policy community should therefore have an 
appreciation for the fact that true conflict resolution requires a broad-based approach that 
integrates various instruments of foreign policy in order to addresses both the drivers and 
consequences of conflict. What these instruments are (economic policy, social engineering, 
political assistance, military assistance, etc) will be dictated by the context of the particular 
conflict that is being addressed by the external actors. If such an approach is beyond the means 
or scope of policy implementing agencies, then they should be prepared to remain in a crisis 
response mode, responding to the effects of violent episodes once they occur. 
This suggests concrete policy approaches in which different tiers of conflict can be best 
addressed by specific actors. In the short term, strategies would focus on crisis response: 
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intervention and/or diplomatic engagement to stop fighting and propel negotiations processes; 
demobilization to disarm and repatriate combatants; and humanitarian assistance to displaced 
populations. In the longer term, policies shift to longer term projects that attempt to proactively 
reduce factors that underlie many conflicts, such as economic inequalities, poverty, and corrupt 
or closed political systems. These programs therefore focus on economic support packages to aid 
reconstruction and address structural imbalances, reduce the insecurities and persecutions that 






ABASA - Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut (Burundi-
African Salvation Alliance)  
Founded in 1993 (pro-Tutsi).  
AV-INTWARI - Alliance des Vaillants 
 
Founded in 1993 (pro-Tutsi). 
CNDD – FDD: Conseil National Pour la Défense de la 
Démocratie - Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie 
(National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces 
for the Defense of Democracy) 
Hutu rebel movement, 
currently a political party. 
CNDD : Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie 
(National Council for the Defense of Democracy) 
Hutu rebel movement, 
separate from CNDD-FDD. 
FAB: Forces Armees du Burundi (Armed Forces of Burundi, 
Burundi Army) 
Tutsi-dominated until 2000 
(or so). 
FDN – Forces de la Défense Nationale (National Defense 
Forces) 
National Defense Force 
created after 2004.  
FNL: Forces Nationales de Libération (National Forces of 
Liberation)  
Hutu political party, the 
renamed Palipehutu-FNL 
after 2009  
Frodebu: Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, FRODEBU 
(Front for Democracy in Burundi) 
Hutu political party. 
FROLINA : Front de Libération Nationale (Front for National 
Liberation)  
Hutu rebel movement (small), 
sometimes political party. 
INKIZO  “Le Bouclier” Formed in 1993 (pro-Tutsi). 
JNR/JRR – Jeunesse Revolutionnaire National / Jeunesse 
Revolutionnaire Rwagasore (National Revolutionary 
Youth / Rwagasore Revolutionary Youth) 
Student wing of UPRONA, 
occasional militia (heavily 
involved in 1972 genocide), at 
times political party (most 
recent dispensation). 
JVMM – Joint Verification and Monitoring Mission Created September 2006 to 
monitor and enforce the 
ceasefire agreement with 
Palipehutu-FNL.  
ONUB- Operation des nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations 
Operation in Burundi) 
Operated 2004 – 2006, 
replaced with civilian mission 
in 2006. 
PALIPEHUTU - FNL: Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu - 
Forces Nationales de Libération (Party for the Liberation 
of the Hutu People - National Forces of Liberation) 
Hutu rebel movement; formed 
in Tanzanian refugee camp. 
Parena - Parti pour le Redressement National (Party for National 
Reconciliation) 
 
Formed in 1995 led by former 
president Jean-Baptiste 
Bagaza (pro-Tutsi). 
PDC - Parti démocratique chrétien (Christian Democratic Party) Batare-clan political party 




PIT - Parti Independent des Travailleurs (Independent Workers’ 
Party) 
Formed in 1993 (pro-Tutsi). 
 
PL – Parti Líberal (Liberal Party)  Formed in 1992 (pro-Tutsi). 
PRP - Parti pour la reconciliation du peuple (Party for the 
Reconciliation of the People)  
Monarchist party, formed in 
1992 (pro-Tutsi). 
 
PSD - Parti Social-Democrate (Social Democratic Party)  
 
Formed in 1993 (pro-Tutsi). 
RPB – Rassemblement pour le Peuple du Burundais (Burundian 
People’s Assembly) 
 
Est. 1992 (pro-Hutu). 
Uprona: Union pour le Progrès national (Union for National 
Progress) 
Tutsi, former ruling party 





1300s - Hutu people settle in the region. 
1400s - Tutsi settlers establish themselves as feudal rulers. 
1890 - The Tutsi kingdom of Urundi (Burundi) and Ruanda (Rwanda) incorporated into German 
East Africa. 
1916 - Belgians occupy the area. 
1923 - Belgium granted League of Nations mandate to administer Ruanda-Urundi. 
1959 - Influx of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda following the Hutu Revolution/Social Revolution. 
 
Independence 
1962 - Urundi is separated from Ruanda-Urundi, becomes Burundi and is given independence as 
a monarchy under King Mwambutsa IV. 
1963 - Thousands of Hutus flee to Rwanda following ethnic violence. 
1965 - King Mwambutsa refuses to appoint a Hutu prime minister even though Hutus win a 
majority in parliamentary elections; attempted coup by Hutu police led by Michel 
Micombero brutally suppressed. 
1966 - July - Mwambutsa deposed by his son, Ntare V. 
1966 - November - Micombero stages a second coup, this time successfully, and declares himself 
president. 
 
Overthrow of monarchy 
1972 - Some 150,000 Hutus are massacred after Ntare V is killed, supposedly by Hutus. Refugee 
flows (Hutu) to Tanzania and Zaire. 
1976 - Micombero is deposed in a military coup and is replaced by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza as 
president. 
1981 - A new constitution makes Burundi a one-party state. 
1987 - President Bagaza is deposed in a coup led by Pierre Buyoya. 
1988 - Thousands of Hutus are massacred by Tutsis and thousands more flee to Rwanda. 
 
Transition Period 
1992 - New constitution providing for a multiparty system is adopted in a referendum. 
1993 - June - Frodebu wins multi-party polls, ending military rule and leading to the installation 
of a pro-Hutu government. 
1993 - October - Tutsi soldiers assassinate Ndadaye. In revenge, some Frodebu members 
massacre Tutsis and the army begins reprisals. Burundi is plunged into an ethnic conflict 
which claims some 300,000 lives. 
1994 - Parliament appoints Cyprien Ntaryamira - a Hutu - as president; Ntaryamira and his 
Rwandan counterpart are killed when the plane carrying them is shot down over the 
Rwandan capital; more ethnic violence and refugees fleeing to Rwanda; parliament speaker 
Sylvestre Ntibantunganya appointed president. 
1995 - Massacre of Hutu refugees leads to renewed ethnic violence in the capital, Bujumbura. 
1996 - Pierre Buyoya stages a second coup, deposing Ntibantunganya and suspending the 
constitution. 
                                                 




Buyoya sworn in 
1998 - Buyoya and parliament agree on a transitional constitution under which Buyoya is 
formally sworn in as president. 
1999 - Talks between warring factions held under the auspices of former Tanzanian President 
Julius Nyerere. 
2000 - Government and three Tutsi groups sign a ceasefire accord, but two main Hutu groups 
refuse to join. 
2001 - January - President Buyoya agrees to ceasefire talks with leader of main ethnic Hutu rebel 
group, Forces for Defence of Democracy (FDD). 
2001 - April - Coup attempt fails. 
2001 - July - Defence minister says authorities have put down an attempted coup. 
 
Transitional government 
2001 - October - Talks brokered by Nelson Mandela lead to installation of transitional 
government under which Hutu and Tutsi leaders will share power. Main Hutu rebel groups 
refuse to sign ceasefire and fighting intensifies. 
2001 - 25 December - Army says it killed more than 500 rebels in operation against opposition 
stronghold near Bujumbura. 
2002 - January - Jean Minani, leader of main Hutu party Frodebu, elected president of 
transitional national assembly set up to bridge ethnic divide. 
2002 - July - Upsurge in fighting delays planned peace talks; army says more than Hutu 200 
rebels have been killed in clashes. 
2002 - December - Government and main Hutu rebel group FDD sign a ceasefire at talks in 
Tanzania, but fighting breaks out a month later. 
2003 - 30 April - Domitien Ndayizeye - a Hutu - succeeds Pierre Buyoya as president, under 
terms of three-year, power-sharing transitional government inaugurated in 2001. 
2003 - July - Major rebel assault on Bujumbura. Some 300 rebels and 15 government soldiers are 
killed. Thousands flee their homes. 
2003 - November - President Ndayizeye and FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza sign agreement to 
end civil war at summit of African leaders in Tanzania. Smaller Hutu rebel group, Forces 
for National Liberation (FNL), remains active. 
2004 - June - UN force takes over peacekeeping duties from African Union troops. 
Hutu rebels kill 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at a camp near the DR Congo border. 
Burundian Hutu rebel group, the FNL, claims responsibility. 
2004 - December - UN and government begin to disarm and demobilize thousands of soldiers 
and former rebels. 
2005 - January - President signs law to set up new national army, incorporating government 
forces and all but one Hutu rebel group, the FNL. 
2005 - March - Voters back power-sharing constitution. 
 
FDD/Nkurunziza Government 
2005 - August - Pierre Nkurunziza, from the Hutu FDD group, is elected as president by the two 
houses of parliament. The FDD won parliamentary elections in June. 




2006 - August - Former President Domitien Ndayizeye is accused of involvement in an alleged 
coup plot. Along with four of his co-accused, he is acquitted by the Supreme Court in 
January 2007. 
2006 - September - The last active rebel group, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), and the 
government sign a ceasefire at talks in Tanzania. 
2006 - December - The increasingly authoritarian government risks triggering unrest and eroding 
the gains of peace, warns the International Crisis Group think tank. 
2007 - February - UN shuts down its peacekeeping mission and refocuses its operations on 
helping with reconstruction. 
2007 - April - DRCongo, Rwanda and Burundi relaunch the regional economic bloc - Great 
Lakes Countries Economic Community - known under its French acronym CEPGL. 
 
Peace process stalls 
2007 - July - Senior FNL figures quit the truce monitoring team for the second time in a few 
months, sparking fears of renewed bloodshed. 
2007 - September - Rival FNL factions clash in Bujumbura, killing 20 fighters and sending 
residents fleeing. Rebel raids are also reported in the north-west of the country. 
2007 - December - Burundian soldiers join African Union peacekeepers in Somalia. 
2008 - April - Former head of governing party, Hussein Radjabu, is sentenced to 13 years in 
prison for undermining state security. Radjabu was accused of plotting armed rebellion and 
insulting President Nkurunziza. 
 
Peace agreement 
2008 - April-May - Renewed fighting between government forces and FNL rebels leaves at least 
100 people dead. 
2008 - May - Government and FNL rebels sign ceasefire. FNL leader Agathon Rwasa returns 
home from exile in Tanzania. 
2009 - March - The Paris club of creditor nations cancels all of the $134.3m debt Burundi owed 
to its members. 
2009 - April - Ex-rebel Godefroid Niyombare becomes first ever Hutu chief of general staff of 
the army. 
2009 - April - Burundi's last rebel group, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), lays down 
arms and officially transforms into a political party in a ceremony supervised by the 
African Union. 
2009 - September - Several Burundian troops are killed in a suicide blast while on a 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia. 
2009 - November - Agathon Rwasa to stand as ex-rebel FNL candidate in the June 2010 
presidential election. 
2010 - January - Thirteen soldiers are arrested for allegedly plotting a coup to overthrow 
President Nkurunziza. 





In October 2008, the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency (DTRA-ASCO) convened a workshop to assess several major categories of current and 
emerging security issues in Africa. The participants were presented with three sets of security 
issues and asked to discuss (1) the state of knowledge about the security issues, (2) how the 
different types of security issues relate to one another, and (3) alternative policy options for 
addressing the problems over the long-term.  In the group focusing on regional and internal 
conflict, the participants fundamentally disagreed about whether policy responses to threats 
stemming from violent conflict should focus on micro-foundations and root causes of the 
conflicts, or the complex crises that decision-makers actually face when attempting to end a 
conflict and deal with its immediate after-effects (such as displaced persons, humanitarian issues, 
disarmament and demobilization, and the proliferation of armed movements).  
Those arguing the former position felt that any attempt to respond to and potentially 
resolve a conflict would fail if it did not address the “real” issues underlying the conflict.  Not 
dealing with fundamental causes would be akin to treating only the symptoms of a disease: the 
damage could be managed, but never truly eradicated. The other camp argued that third-party 
interveners and international policy community could only feasibly address the highest tier of 
conflict that presents itself at the time the intervention occurs, such as responding to refugee 
flows, addressing humanitarian needs, and seeking to obtain ceasefires and demobilize militant 
groups. This group argued that because the root causes of conflicts in many parts of Africa are 
deeply political and economic issues that require a long-term developmental approach, most 
actors in the international community would not be able to address them when responding to an 
ongoing crisis. The foreign policy community, they argued, have to deal with the situation as it 
stands when they become involved, which means seeking to end the violent phase of a conflict, 
helping to manage refugees and the internally displaced, and providing humanitarian assistance.3  
The argument at the workshop was not merely academic. It underscores a larger debate 
that surfaces in multiple interactions between the foreign policy community and regional experts, 
                                                 
2 I would like to thank Terrence Lyons and Gilbert Khadiagala for their constructive and helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. All opinions in this work are my own and do not represent official positions of the 
Department of Defense or United States Government.  
3 Jennifer Perry, Jessica Piombo and Jennifer Borchard, African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon 
Workshop Report (report number ASCO 2009 – 001), January 2009. 
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also evident in the virulent reaction from the American academic community to the creation of 
the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in 2007.  Critics of USAFRICOM felt that 
creating the command inappropriately militarized U.S. foreign policy towards Africa and would 
not help the fundamental economic, social and political problems that drive much of the conflict 
on the continent. While acknowledging the deep economic and political challenges that 
undermine stability in Africa, others felt that there still was a contribution to be made in the 
military realm, which would work in concert with other aspects of foreign policy. The “whole of 
government” approach would enable different instruments of the American foreign policy 
community to work together to create a more stable, secure and prosperous Africa.  In this 
vision, military assistance becomes one aspect of an integrated approach. 
 USAFRICOM struggled in its first years to decide how it should best assist in Africa’s 
stabilization. As military planners began to develop plans for USAFRICOM engagement in 
specific countries, and as they learned more and more about the continent’s history and how 
conflicts in African countries begin and perpetuate, they soon realized that the causes of conflicts 
were deeply rooted in problematic political and economic systems. Planners understood that a 
conflict may have been rooted in economic inequalities generated over two hundred years of 
skewed policies and corrupt governance, but the tools that they could employ to assist the 
country did not include developmental assistance. Most of the programs that USAFRICOM 
planners can utilize are of a type that seeks to strengthen a country’s security apparatus so that it 
can respond to insurgencies on its own.  They understood the deeper causes of security threats, 
but could only respond to the symptoms.4   
 USAFRICOM’s dilemma is shared by many external actors who are tasked with 
responding to violent conflict. What should be the goals of external intervention: to resolve the 
fundamental issues driving conflict, or to help stabilize the situation in the short term, with the 
goal of enabling domestic processes to sort out the deeper drivers of unrest? A potential way to 
capture the predicament would be to ask if and when external actors should undertake a program 
of conflict settlement or conflict management.  A settlement strategy would seek the full 
resolution of the conflict, including the root causes, while a management strategy is a second-
best option that considers true resolution unattainable, and which therefore seeks to contain and 
                                                 
4 Discussions with USAFRICOM country team planners in the Strategy, Plans and Programs Directorate, Stuttgart, 
Germany (April, June and November 2008).  
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mitigate the effects of the conflict. 5 This dynamic does not quite capture the debate, however. 
The concept of conflict management implies that the tensions are still high, but sustainably 
processed to prevent violence. The dilemma confronting USAFRICOM is more about whether to 
focus on the “surface level” of conflict, i.e. the immediate effects of ongoing violence and 
conditions to attain and enforce a ceasefire, or to address the deep causes that motivated the 
conflict in the first place.  
 Another way to capture the distinction is between a short-term, crisis-response approach 
and a long-term, conflict resolution approach. Thinking in terms of crisis response versus 
conflict resolution captures the dilemma faced by the policy formulation and implementation 
communities: respond in the short term and address the most pressing effects of conflict (and 
then exit the situation); or seek to use the mediation effort as a process to open up the 
fundamental issues that prevent full resolution of the violence. The short-term approach seeks to 
terminate the conflicts and deal with immediate effects; the long-term perspective pursues broad-
based peacebuilding and societal reconciliation.6  
This project represents a preliminary investigation of these questions by examining one 
case in depth: third-party efforts to resolve the Burundian civil war of the 1990s. This war, which 
began at the end of 1993 and continued in various phases through 2009, has undergone multiple 
rounds of negotiations facilitated by international actors. Throughout the study, the analysis asks 
why did various actors take different positions regarding crisis-response or conflict resolution 
during substantive negotiations, what influences the choice of one strategy over another, and 
what are the different outcomes of the choices made? The analysis focuses on the issues raised 
during substantive negotiations, rather than the whole range of strategies and mechanisms 
utilized to advance the overall peace process.7 In each of these rounds of negotiations, lead 
facilitators selected a different set of issues to include in the negotiations processes. Some 
negotiators focused on establishing preconditions and agenda setting, others on signing 
                                                 
5 Stefan Wolff, “Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts,” in Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives 
on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia, ed. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
6 The seminal work in this approach is John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1998).  
7 Because the research question focuses on the issues brought into negotiations, the paper does not assess 
interventions of a purely military nature, those that worked on creating a regional framework to deal with the 
broader effects of the war, or the role of sanctions in getting parties to the negotiating table. These are all important 
aspects to understanding the Burundian case in its entirety, but are less pertinent to the debate about which 
substantive issues are or are not included in negotiations.  
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ceasefires and setting up transitional processes, and still others attempted – though they often 
failed – to bring fundamental issues into the realm of the negotiations that they facilitated. There 
were efforts from various actors based in the United States, Europe, the United Nations, and 
several African-led mediation efforts.  
The entire cycle of conflict and negotiation in Burundi can serve as a case study to 
analyze the effects of focusing on different levels and types of issues. Due to the wide range of 
negotiation strategies and actors, the Burundi case contains significant internal variation that 
allows comparison across different negotiations periods. These comparisons will enable the 
project to assess the outcomes of different strategies of negotiations. Additionally, compared to 
other African conflicts where over time a resource logic warped a struggle that began over 
political issues, the Burundian conflict remained tied to its roots throughout its evolution. The 
core issues fomenting conflict in 1993 were much the same as those generating tensions and 
massacres in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1991. That the Burundians were not able to resolve the issues 
points to the fact that they are not “easy” issues to resolve, but the stability of the issues allows 
an analysis of the complex process of peace negotiations that does not have to trace ever-
changing motivations for the actors. A similar exercise for the war in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo would have been much more complex, as the armed factions multiplied every time an 
armed group realized that there were substantial material gains to be made from the war 
enterprise in that mineral-rich country.  The Burundi case therefore presents a stylized conflict, 
which simplifies the issues for analysis. 
Throughout this paper, the concepts used to capture the contrasting approaches will focus 
on process versus content and on the nature of the issues brought into the substantive 
negotiations. When negotiations strategies are analyzed for focusing on process versus content, 
the discussion refers to whether there were any substantive issues at all raised in the negotiations 
(content) or whether they focused more on procedures to bring parties together, establish the 
framework for talks, or set the agenda for more substantive discussions (process).  When 
analyzing substantive negotiations, the analysis then focuses on which issues are put on the table. 
The phrase “crisis-response strategies” refers to short-term perspectives that raise issues 
pertaining to conflict termination and ending violence (securing the negative peace), as well as 
with dealing with the immediate effects of conflict. The concept of “conflict-resolution 
strategies,” in contrast, will be applied when negotiators incorporate discussions of root causes 
 5
and fundamental drivers of conflict in the context of the peace talks that they mediate. The 
phrases root causes and fundamental drivers are used interchangeably in the paper. There could 
be a range of alternate ways to conceptualize this particular set of choices facing mediators 
seeking to end complex, violent conflicts,8 but for our purposes this distinction seems to help a 
study of negotiations processes as a microcosm to study larger policy debates about responding 
to root causes versus complex emergencies (symptoms of those deeper causes). 
 
PEACEMAKING PROCESSES 
This policy-focused debate also surfaces in the academic literature on peacemaking. Scholars 
have debated whether, why and how peacemakers should focus on root causes or complex 
emergencies; and they have attempted to analyze the consequences of different strategies of 
negotiations. In the literature on the place and role of negotiations and peace agreements in 
ending civil wars, much attention has focused on when negotiations for peace begin and debates 
over what makes for success and failure in the peace process.9 Debates on the success and failure 
of negotiated settlements have revolved around several themes: the timing of negotiations, the 
negotiations process, the nature of the peace agreement, the presence – or creation – of spoilers 
during the peace process, and the implementation of peace accords.10 The issues motivating this 
project find most resonance in two of these: the nature and process of the negotiations and the 
nature of the peace agreement.  
 
Nature of the Peace Negotiations 
One fundamental challenge facing negotiators during the process of a negotiation or mediation 
effort is the dual issue of whether peace talks should address the root causes of a conflict or to 
                                                 
8 Some of these alternative conceptualizations include negative versus positive peace, sequencing, conflict resolution 
as a blueprint versus flexible process, and nested peacebuilding. I am indebted to Terrence Lyons for drawing out 
these distinctions.  
9 Though this project is concerned with the ways that choices shape outcomes, rather than a simple success/failure 
dichotomy, most of the literature discusses outcomes in terms of success and failure. I am intentionally not 
measuring “success” or “failure” of the negotiations in order to enable a more nuanced analysis of the effects of 
negotiations strategies. Peace negotiations are an iterative process and each one has a different goal, in this context 
simply measuring “success” or “failure” is both vague and inappropriate.  
10 For a few overviews of this literature, see Adrian Guelke, “Negotiations and Peace Processes,” in Contemporary 
Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, eds. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (New York and 
London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); John Paul Lederach, “Cultivating Peace: A Practitioner’s View of Deadly 
Conflict and Negotiation,” in Contemporary Peacemaking; Timothy Sisk, “Peacemaking in Civil Wars: Obstacles, 
Options and Opportunities,” in Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in 
Europe, Africa and Asia, ed. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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simply attempt to facilitate a ceasefire, help deal with the worst humanitarian issues, and allow 
domestic parties to manage their fundamental differences after the fighting ends. Often this 
dynamic is viewed in either-or terms, though many experienced negotiators would argue that 
both need to be considered simultaneously. Including root causes into conflict-termination 
negotiations is often not easy, however. For example, international actors may not be positioned 
to address certain types of fundamental causes of conflict in the short-term; they may not 
understand the sources of the conflict or consider them too complex to be incorporated into 
peace negotiations; and/or the international actors may consider halting the conflict and 
addressing humanitarian considerations the top priority and only aspect appropriate for their 
involvement.  
At other times, certain parties to the conflict may not be willing to allow discussion of 
certain fundamental issues; when this is the case, if those parties are still strong at the point of 
negotiations, they can prevent fundamental issues from being placed on the agenda. This case is 
typical of a situation like that found in South Africa and in Burundi, where multiple rounds of 
“talks about talks” were necessary to set the acceptable agenda for substantive peace 
negotiations. When setting the agenda for the Dayton discussions that ended the Bosnian war, 
international actors had to promise Bosnian and Serbian principals that the Kosovo issue would 
not be considered; without this promise, the Serbian leaders would not have even attended the 
talks.11 Years later, the fact that Kosovo was not included was considered a major flaw of the 
Dayton Accords, but it was a tradeoff that was necessary to end one phase of the war.  
Experienced mediators argue that both aspects have to be addressed: the crises that finally 
motivated intervention and/or third-party mediation, and the fundamental causes motivating the 
conflict.  
Adding to the burden of peacemaking, the mediator has to focus both on the deep-
rooted causes of the conflict and on the crises that arise. The causes may be 
structural (e.g. the absence of strong institutions of governance); political (e.g. 
authoritarianism and discrimination); historical (e.g. the colonial demarcation of 
borders and divide-and-rule policies); and socioeconomic (e.g. deprivation and 
underdevelopment). In Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC, Darfur and southern Sudan, 
                                                 
11 Author’s conversations with several American principals; identities withheld. (Crystal City, Arlington, February 
2007).  
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these causes were present simultaneously. The deep-rooted problems are 
extremely hard to solve. Where countries in conflict have weak institutions of 
governance, the government might be unable to provide credible negotiators who 
can deliver on their promises, it might lack control over its security forces and it 
might be unable to implement the agreements it signs. 
 
It seems painfully obvious that deep-rooted conflict cannot be solved quickly or 
easily. Nevertheless, mediators and donor governments frequently make the 
mistake of seeking a quick fix. They have honourable intentions, wanting to stop 
the destruction and suffering and to provide safe space for humanitarian 
operations and reconstruction, but they underestimate the complexity of the 
conflict, overestimate their powers of persuasion and ignore the psychopolitical 
dynamics of violence. Flouting the imperative that the parties and their 
constituencies must own the settlement, they push hard for rapid results. This 
approach can be distinctly counter-productive.12 
Here, South African conflict resolution specialist Laurie Nathan identifies a core duality in the 
peacemaking process. There is a fundamental contradiction between the desire for short term 
solutions that would enable the international community to quickly extradite itself from a 
situation, and the long term, deeper structural issues that have to be addressed in order to prevent 
conflict from re-occurring. The desire to end suffering quickly does not necessarily fit the need 
to tackle deeper issues motivating the conflict. When a negotiation process is facilitated by third-
party actors interested in stabilizing the situation by securing a negative peace they may therefore 
focus on the immediate drivers and effects of conflict and intentionally avoid opening up 
consideration of the deeper issues underlying the situation. 
 Regardless of the motivation, the result is that there is a choice in negotiations strategies: 
facilitators can focus on process, on getting participants in the talks to agree on a few basic 
principles and establish procedures for solving their differences once the mediation is over. This 
is analogous to the crisis response strategy discussed previously: mediators attempt to halt and 
contain conflict in the short term (otherwise known as the negative peace). Alternatively, third-
                                                 
12 Laurie Nathan, “The Challenges Facing Mediation in Africa.” AFRICA Mediators’ Retreat 2009 – The Oslo 
Forum Network of Mediators. http://innovationfair.spigit.com/Core/Download/?docid=235 (accessed April 10, 
2010).  
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party negotiators can attempt to get participants to delve into the issues that underlie the conflict 
while they are present and able to help mediate between the parties. This conflict resolution 
strategy would aim to create a condition of positive peace by pursuing a process that is more 
likely to uncover root causes. 
 
Nature of the Peace Agreement 
What the final text of peace accords include has also been found to be a decisive element in how 
the agreements shape future developments, and is obviously connected to whether negotiations 
focused on process or root causes. There is a great deal of evidence that even if difficult to raise 
during the negotiations phase, the exclusion of root causes from peace talks and negotiations can 
derail a peace process at multiple points in the cycle. For example, flawed peace accords 
prevented the attainment of a peaceful settlement to Tajikistan’s civil war of the mid-1990s. The 
peace accords focused only on ending the violent phase of the conflict and creating a semblance 
of stability, and therefore they did not address underlying causes. By making this tradeoff, the 
agreements merely created a temporary cessation of conflicts, leaving the fundamental 
grievances that motivated the combatants in the first place unresolved. In this case, conflict 
resumed soon after the peace agreements had been reached.13  Additionally the negotiations 
process excluded several key players, so that the resultant peace agreement institutionalized 
regional inequalities that had initially incited the conflict. Deep rooted issues, ignored by the 
peace accords, continued to drive the parties apart and perpetuated the conditions that caused the 
conflict in the first place, to the point of fostering new conflicts. Similar anecdotes can be told 
about a number of conflicts that have been resolved through third-party mediation.  
  Therefore like those in the U.S. foreign policy community, scholars have debated 
whether negotiated peace agreements should address root causes of the conflict or to halt the 
fighting and create a space in which the political actors could work out the fundamental issues, 
through some sort of formal process that the peace agreement created (often through a 
transitional government that would decide the new rules of the game).14  Is it too difficult to 
tackle the basic problems that created conflict during the negotiation process, and better to focus 
ending violent conflict? Or, would this strategy merely push resolution of the key problems to a 
                                                 
13 Kathleen Collins, “Tajikistan: Bad Peace Agreements and Prolonged Civil Conflict,” in From Promise to 
Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003), 269. 
14 Timothy Sisk, “Peacemaking in Civil Wars.” 
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phase where internal forces would dominate and international attention would be less focused, 
thus only postponing a difficult process to a point where the local power holders would 
dominate? Were peace agreements more likely to fail because of power politics or because they 
failed to address root causes?15 
There are additional long-term consequences to the process versus content approach to 
peace negotiations. There are practical reasons why peace settlements may focus on conflict 
termination rather than root causes. One strategy to increase participation in negotiations 
processes is to exclude certain issues from the negotiations. When certain issues are too sensitive 
to include in a negotiations process, even after multiple rounds of agenda-setting meetings, peace 
talks will often settle for focusing on rules and processes for conflict termination. The resultant 
peace agreement most often establishes certain core principles and aims to set up a 
domestic/transitional government that would then be responsible to process the grievances that 
caused conflict in the first place.  
This strategic choice could extend conflict in several ways. First, the exclusion of certain 
key issues could alienate those parties who are most driven by them, compelling these parties to 
remain outside the negotiations processes. Postponing consideration of root causes also means 
that the most difficult issues will be sorted through by the agents invested in the peace process 
and the new government. While this promotes ownership, the potential downside is that the 
subsequent government is likely to conduct this business outside the lens of international 
attention. At this stage, reneging on commitments to discuss and address the root causes is more 
likely, which could cause conflict to re-emerge. Not only does the absence of international 
attention make reneging on it more feasible, but it might subject the entire discussion to a 
credible commitment problem.  The weaker parties may not trust the transitional regime, which 
often is dominated by factions that were strong at the end of the conflict, which could then cause 
a security dilemma. Not all the groups will trust the stronger parties to openly discuss the real 
issues motivating a conflict, and this lack of trust could move them back to pre-emptive fighting 
before they weaken further. 16   
                                                 
15 Adrian Guelke, “Negotiations and Peace Processes.” 
16 The security dilemma dynamic arises between rival ethnic groups when the state is no longer a neutral arbiter or 
has weakened to the point where it fails to mediate the relationships between ethnic groups. In this situation, a group 
that considers itself under imminent threat of attack is likely to preemptively strike to protect itself. See David A. 
Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” International 
Security 21 (2) (Autumn 1996): 41 – 75. 
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After peace negotiations are completed and the implementation phase has begun, more 
problems may arise. Guelke argues that negotiated settlements may derail not only because of 
what is allowed into discussion, but also due to power dynamics that arise during 
implementation.17 He finds that settlements that do not rest on a normative foundation separate 
from the power politics of the conflict are unlikely to prove durable. Therefore, avoiding 
consideration of the root causes that fomented conflict in the first place can often lead a peace 
process to break down.   
The content of peace talks connect with another theme in the peacemaking literature, that 
of spoilers.  Spoilers are groups that threaten a peace process through the resumption of violence, 
and are typically thought to arise when groups are excluded from the process or when groups that 
are losing power within the negotiations process resort to violence to increase their bargaining 
position.18 Spoilers can also be created as a byproduct of the content of the negotiations 
themselves, as groups who are dissatisfied with the format or content of the talks use violence to 
try to push their issues onto the agenda. Groups often walk out on negotiations over these issues, 
or they may splinter into factions; either of these outcomes can create problems and are 
byproducts of the nature of the negotiations process. Similarly, a group that does not feel a cause 
is legitimate, and that a militant group should not receive consideration of their position just 
because they have the ability to create violence, could protest the inclusion of certain issues. 
These considerations compel analysis to focus attention not just on issues of content versus 
process, but also to consider which issues are put onto the negotiation table: power politics and 
concerns that exist at the point the negations are initiated or the basic root causes that caused 
conflict in the first place.  
 
BURUNDI’S CONFLICTS 
The case of the Burundian civil war of the 1990s provides a lens through which to examine the 
dynamics just discussed. Burundi has experienced cycles of intense violence since achieving 
independence in 1962, a seemingly endless number of coups and attempted coups, and one major 
                                                 
17 Guelke, “Negotiations and Peace Processes,” p. 53.  
18 Typically, spoilers are thought to arise from two aspects of the peace process: groups left outside of the 
negotiations process (outside spoilers) and those who find they are losing power within the talks (inside spoilers). 
For outside spoilers, the prospect for peace may threaten their very existence, and so they will oppose any peace 
process. Inside spoilers tend to arise during the implementation phase, as a group that comes to distrust that others 
will keep their promises come to face a commitment problem. See Marie-Joelle Zahar, “Reframing the Spoiler 
Debate in Peace Processes,” in Contemporary Peacemaking. 
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civil war between 1993 and 2009, when the last significant rebel group ceased hostilities and 
began to transition into a political party (it had signed a ceasefire in 2006).19 International actors 
attempted to bring an end to the latest manifestation of violence within a month of its initiation, 
and they remained engaged throughout the conflict. Various parties to the conflict have signed 
multiple peace accords and ceasefire agreements during this time. At the conclusion of a four-
year transitional government, the Fourth Republic came into existence in 2005. Elections for the 
national legislature and president are scheduled for mid-2010. 
The issues underlying this cycle of conflict in Burundi are rooted in the country’s history 
and the political manipulation of traditional authority and ethnic relations. Similar issues spurred 
violence in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993-2009. In each of these periods, violence was 
triggered by an attempt to change the social composition of the ruling group, with attacks 
generating retaliatory counter-attacks that escalated violence and further altered the character of 
the government and security forces. Over time, a fluid political system where clan and regional 
rivalries dominated politics evolved into a stable system of ethnic domination, with a small Tutsi 
elite in control of an authoritarian political system buttressed by an ethnically-exclusive, 
repressive security apparatus. As a result of three decades of conflict, certain issues became 
almost non-negotiable to the power elite, yet were such fundamental issues for the opposition 
that in order for the conflict cycles to be terminated, the issues had to be addressed. Therefore 
explaining the root causes of the 1993 civil war requires a presentation of significant events and 
dynamics in Burundi’s history.  
Burundi’s conflict is most often described as an ethnic clash between Hutu and Tutsi. 
Like the northern neighbor Rwanda, Hutu constitute approximately 85 percent of the population, 
Tutsi 14 percent, and Twa one percent.20 Unlike Rwanda, where Hutu were in power since 1959, 
the minority Tutsi were able to seize and retain control of the Burundian government throughout 
most of the country’s independence.  The ethnic overtones of the conflict hide the significant 
                                                 
19 Some would provide dates of 1994 to 2005 for the war; this would represent the time that the CNDD-FDD and 
Palipehutu-FNL initiated large-scale resistance to a power-sharing government and when the subsequent 
Transitional Government of Burundi ceased operating and handed power to an elected government. I am using 1993 
– 2009 because this round of conflict began as inter-ethnic massacres in 1993, and 2009 was when the last rebel 
group actually began to disarm and demobilize. 
20 CIA World Factbook: Burundi. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html 
(accessed April 5, 2010). Filip Reyntjens notes that no census has been taken in Burundi since independence, and 
that the convention is to use an approximation of the ethnic balance: 85/15, Hutu/Tutsi. Reyntjens, “The Proof of the 
Pudding is in the Eating: the June 1993 Elections in Burundi.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 4 
(1993): 563-583, 563. 
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within-group divisions, which are regional, clan-based and political.21 These divisions have 
propelled much of the conflict in Burundi, with ethnic groups mobilized to pursue political 
agendas. Over time, however, the politically-motivated conflicts have generated deep social 
cleavages in the country, with high levels of distrust between the Hutu and Tutsi peasants in the 
rural areas.  
 Burundi, like Rwanda, is a small country, roughly the size of Belgium or Texas. Both 
countries are the two most densely populated territories in all of Africa, which means that unlike 
other African countries, virtually every scrap of arable land is populated and utilized. Land 
ownership and use rights create powerful pressures in each of these small countries. The 
landscapes are dominated by rolling hills that organize the social and economic life of the 
predominantly rural and agrarian populations. Burundian society was hierarchically organized 
under the Kingdom of Urundi before the arrival of Europeans in the late 1800s. Traditional 
authority was exercised by the king (mwami) surrounded by a royal court composed of princely 
families, the ganwa. Until the arrival of Europeans in the late 1800s, the mwami presided of a 
system of chiefs and sub-chiefs where leaders were selected through a lineage system, and most 
mwami were Tutsi. Most of the ganwa were also Tutsi, as were the elite class within Urundi, 
though there were also Hutu chiefs in the southwest parts of the country. Before colonial rule 
changed the dynamics between these groups, Hutu and Tutsi functioned as class signifiers 
(richer, cattle and land owners were considered Tutsi, while poorer, agrarian and manual laborers 
were Hutu). With wealth, a family could change its “ethnic” signifier, and the ganwa ruled both 
Hutu and Tutsi.  
In 1890 the Ruanda-Urundi territory was incorporated into German East Africa, bringing 
Burundi (Urundi) and Rwanda (Ruanda) into the orbit of European colonialism for the first time. 
The Belgians took control of the area in 1916, and subsequently were granted a League of 
Nations mandate to administer Ruanda-Urundi. The Belgians implemented a policy of indirect 
rule in which they selected certain Tutsi ganwa families to populate colonial administrative 
structures. This set off a cycle where ganwa from different regions of the country competed for 
privileged positions within colonial structures, and where the Belgians would attempt to meddle 
in the succession lines of ganwa in order to secure the selection of mwami deemed suitable to 
                                                 
21 Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and 
Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1994]); Filip Reyntjens, “Briefing Burundi: A Peaceful Transition After a 
Decade of War?” African Affairs105, no. 418 (December 2005): 117-135.  
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Belgian interests. In this process Belgian rule advantaged two particular clan groups, the Batare 
and Bezi clans, providing them with a disproportionate number of chiefdoms throughout the 
country.22 The competition between Batare and Bezi was later reproduced in the first political 
parties, the Union pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress, Uprona) and the Parti 
Démocratique Chrétien (Christian Democratic Party, PDC). The Belgians also eliminated all of 
the Hutu chiefdoms through administrative centralization and reorganization programs, placing 
Hutu peasants completely under Tutsi control. At the same time, the Belgians developed and 
implemented a system of racial classification that firmly divided Hutu and Tutsi, and which 
advantaged the Tutsi group economically, socially and politically. The Hutu were denied 
educational opportunities and transformed into a lower-caste group of manual laborers.23 
 
Politicizing Ethnicity: Laying Foundations for Future Conflicts 
As independence drew near, elites in both Ruanda and Urundi began to position themselves for 
the post-colonial dispensation.24 Both countries had similar social composition and economic 
profiles, and both experienced colonial administrations that had privileged a minority group and 
positioned it to assume leadership in the independence era. But according to the principles of 
majoritarian democracy, the Tutsi group would never be able to retain this position without 
subverting the democratic systems that the Belgians were planning to create. Hutu in Ruanda 
organized earlier than those in Urundi, and by 1957 had issued a manifesto that called for them 
to exercise the power that their numbers should grant. Two years later, the Hutu in Ruanda 
staged a “social revolution,” (also called the Hutu Revolution and Rwandan Revolution), in 
which they seized power from the Tutsi, creating an exodus of Tutsi refugees that flowed into 
Urundi, Zaire and Tanzania.  
In Urundi, nascent political parties were built on the princely rivalries that had been 
manipulated during Belgian rule. Uprona and the PDC, initially identified with the Bezi and 
Batare ganwa families, respectively, attempted to control the chieftaincies and the new state that 
                                                 
22 Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, 38 – 41. 
23 For the most comprehensive account of this process, see Jean Pierre Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two 
Thousand Years of History (translated by Scott Strauss) (Zone Press, distributed by MIT Press, 2003); and for 
Burundi specifically, Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide.  For the political implications of this 
process in Rwanda, see Peter Uvin, “Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda,” African Studies Review 40 (2) 
(September 1997): 91-115. 
24 This text uses the colonial names for Rwanda (Ruanda) and Burundi (Urundi) during the colonial era, and Rwanda 
and Burundi after independence in each country.  
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was emerging between 1959 and 1962.  Bezi and Batare hail from different regions of the 
country, lending a regional overtone to the competition as well: those from Muramvya as 
opposed to those from Bururi province. The events to the north, however, and the influx of 
(rabidly anti-Hutu) Tutsi refugees, made Tutsi in Burundi fearful that the dispossessed Hutu 
would rise up and attempt a similar revolution at home. Uprona and the PDC therefore, while 
dominated by the Tutsi ganwa, included Hutu representatives in the rank and file, and even some 
leadership positions. 
Soon after independence in 1962, leadership struggles within Uprona began to group the 
party into Hutu and Tutsi factions, and from this point, political struggles manipulated ethnic 
divisions into enduring political cleavages capable of producing violent conflict. The early 
factions within Uprona aligned with an emerging divide between those supportive and those 
opposed to the monarchy’s continued involvement in Burundian politics. At independence 
Burundi utilized a parliamentary system, headed by the mwami, who appointed the prime 
minister. Uprona swept the pre-independence elections, but when party leader and Prime 
Minister-designate, Prince Luis Rwagasore, was killed by a PDC-sponsored assassin in October 
1961, the party lost a unifying figure with strong nationalist credentials. Rwagasore’s death 
triggered a crisis of authority and leadership struggle within Uprona, which further undermined 
and factionalized the party. Tutsi elements of the power elite began to lose confidence in 
Uprona’s ability to resist a demonstration effect of the 1959 Rwandan revolution, further 
separating Hutu and Tutsi camps. The monarchy attempted to play a balancing role, trying to 
ensure relative parity between political, lineage and ethnic groupings, but the governments were 
unstable.25 By 1965 the state was already on its fourth government.  
In January 1965 a Hutu prime minister was assassinated just one week after taking office, 
setting off a political crisis that eventually led to the reorganization of the state and the military. 
Legislative elections in May 1965 had affirmed Uprona’s position as the ruling party and Hutu 
candidates swept the polls, but King Mwambutsa appointed a Tutsi ganwa as Prime Minister. In 
October, a faction of the Hutu-dominated national police (gendarmerie) unsuccessfully attempted 
to overthrow the government, and elements of the gendarmerie massacred Tutsis in some parts of 
the country. Captain Michel Micombero rallied Tutsi elites and military officers to repel the 
coup, and afterwards engaged in a swift and brutal retaliation for the attempted coup. They 
                                                 
25 Reyntjens, “Burundi: Prospects for Peace,” 7. 
 15
arrested and/or executed Hutu political leaders, purged Hutu officers from the Forces Armees du 
Burundi (FAB, Armed Forces of Burundi, Burundi Army), and massacred Hutu peasants 
throughout the country. Thousands of Hutu refugees left for Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire.26   
A year later, Micombero staged his own coup and overthrew the monarchy.27 Micombero 
proclaimed himself the President of the First Republic and ruled Burundi for the next 10 years. 
During this time, the Tutsi elite consolidated Burundi’s power structures under Tutsi control and 
intensified ethnic power rivalries as a result. They  systematically eliminated Hutu from 
government (national, provincial and local), “Tutsified” the officer and enlisted corps of the 
military, and “Bururified” the officer corps – not only did they alter the ethnic composition, but 
also culled most officers who were not Tutsi from Bururi province. Government reorganization 
in 1969 further consolidated Tutsi control and subsequently established Uprona as the de jure 
single party, while abolishing parliament and establishing the National Revolutionary Council as 
the main government structure.  
This coup and retaliation set a dynamic that would be followed in the wake of every 
subsequent effort by Hutu to seize political power.  Hutu periodically attempted to overthrow the 
Tutsi government in 1972, 1988 and 1991, and each time the cycle repeated: a Hutu insurgency 
or coup attempt would inflict initial casualties on Tutsi, followed by large-scale retaliation 
against Hutu. In the wake of each retaliation, Tutsi increased their hold on power, 
institutionalizing minority rule a bit more each time, creating a more ethnically homogenous 
military in the wake of each purge. The 1972 killings were initiated by an organized Hutu 
resistance and the subsequent nationwide massacres of Hutu were waged by the army, 
gendarmerie and a Tutsi student organization, and the Jeunesse Revolutionnaire National (JNR, 
National Revolutionary Youth, later called the JRR, Rwagasore Revolutionary Youth). These 
killings have been called the 1972 Hutu genocide, and caused one of the most significant 
exoduses of refugees into neighboring countries. In contrast the 1988 conflict was more 
spontaneous and the violence limited to two northern areas, Ntega and Maranga. This outbreak 
of violence occurred following a series of incidents which had increased local Hutu frustrations 
                                                 
26 Lemarchand’s Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide is one of the most comprehensive accounts of this entire 
historical period; Reyntjens’ “Burundi: Prospects for Peace,” the most concise.  
27 Micombero ruled from 1966 to 1976; he was then overthrown by Lt. Col. Jean Baptise Bagaza. Bagaza further 
institutionalized Tutsi hegemony and ruled until 1987, when Major Pierre Buyoya staged a bloodless coup that 
successfully unseated Bagaza. Both Buyoya and Bagaza are Hima Tutsi, one of the traditional ruling groups within 
Tutsi. Following the 1988 Hutu uprising and massacres, Buyoya came under intense international pressure and 
initiated a transitional process designed to liberalize Burundi’s government and economy.  
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about ever achieving economic or political improvement. Tutsi local government officials had 
harassed Hutu businessmen, and local Uprona candidate selection processes had excluded all 
Hutu candidates in the months preceding the violence. The actual Hutu against Tutsi violence 
was triggered when the arrival of certain Tutsi politicians sparked rumors that “another 1972” 
was about to happen. Hutu youth spontaneously retaliated and killed any Tutsi in sight (late June 
1988), and then themselves were brutally repressed by the army under Buyoya’s command (July 
– August). In 1991, militants of a Hutu organization, Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu 
(Palipehutu, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) that had formed in the Tanzanian 
refugee camps attacked Tutsi, in turn sparking retaliatory killings of Hutu. In Tutsi collective 
memory, this incident stokes fears about the genocide that they think would inevitably happen to 
them should the Hutu come to power.28   
 
Root Causes of Burundi’s Conflicts 
Despite the differences in the violence and triggers for each episode, the underlying causes and 
the repercussions not only were the same, they also increased in intensity with each conflict 
cycle. Each of these factors later became one of the root causes of the civil war: Hutu political 
oppression and the increasing institutionalization of Tutsi hegemony; a repressive and ethnically 
exclusive military that operated to protect the interests of the power elite; and the increasing 
economic and educational inequalities between Hutu and Tutsi.  The early conflicts were never 
fully resolved, and the ways that the power elite settled the violence in each period exacerbated 
the fundamental causes that underlined the next round of violence.   
Of all these root causes, the most fundamental was that over time the government, 
military and gendarmerie became almost entirely Tutsi. Following each incident the government 
purged Hutu from government and security structures, increasing the minority domination of the 
majority. Each successive coup and government reorganization consolidated power under the 
head of state, creating every more autocratic and powerful executives. As a result of these 
changes the security structures lost all independence and were turned into agents dedicated to 
upholding the Tutsi ethnocracy. Burundi experts refer to this as the “Tutsification” of the 
military. The military also assumed an almost entirely inward-focus during these cycles, working 
with the national police to ensure internal security.  
                                                 
28 For specifics, see the conflict cycle tables in appendix one of this report.  
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Once the corporate identity of the military evolved into being the protector of the Tutsi 
oligarchy, the composition and mission of the military became, in and of itself, a cause for future 
conflict. Military structure, composition and mission later emerged as one of the core issues that 
kept the two largest rebel groups fighting long after the rest had signed peace accords. On their 
side, any attempt to liberalize the polity and/or instill some degree of ethnic parity in the military 
became threatening to the military’s identity and core mission. This was especially evident in the 
1991 conflict cycle. In 1989, after just one year of political liberalization, ultra-conservative 
elements in the military had attempted to overthrow their own Tutsi president, Buyoya, in order 
to halt political reforms. This faction was aligned with a former ruler, Jean Baptiste Bagaza, and 
when the Palipehutu-assisted Hutu uprising began in 1991, Buyoya took the opportunity to purge 
this element of the military as well.  
Finally, each cycle of violence eliminated more Hutu politicians and educated people 
from the Burundian population in general, who were lost either to assassinations/executions or to 
refugee flows. Additionally, changes to the educational system ensured that only Tutsi would 
gain sufficient education to enter the civil service, so that over time most of the lucrative 
government jobs were held by Tutsi. Once the educated Hutu were either killed or driven into 
exile, and those that remained were subjected to educational restrictions under Bagaza’s 11-year 
rule (1976-1987), the Hutu population within the country became increasingly under-educated 
and qualified, in comparison to the Tutsi. Lucrative, well-paying skilled and government jobs 
increasingly went to Tutsi, creating an ever-widening gap between the communities. 
Government patronage networks excluded Hutu, further enriching Tutsi and widening the gap 
between the two groups. While the Hutu therefore sought to advance their socioeconomic status, 
and considered this a rightful redress for decades of skewed policies, Tutsi were threatened by 
this quest.  
Because the root causes were made worse in the wake of each conflict cycle, rather than 
addressed in a constructive way, over the course of this 30 year conflict cycle the Hutu 
radicalized and came to see violent resistance as the only way to achieve power. Multiple 
movements formed in exile, the largest of which was Palipehutu, which generated and then 
merged with an armed wing, the Forces Nationales de Libération (National Forces of Liberation, 
FNL), creating Palipehutu-FNL. The repeated cycle of violence created a collective memory 
within the Hutu population, both those within Burundi and the refugees abroad, cultivating an 
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ever-present fear of another holocaust.29 In this situation the government became increasingly 
illegitimate in the eyes of the Hutu, the military functioned as the guardians and enforcers of the 
Tutsi ethnocracy, and the Hutu came to believe that there was no way to gain any political power 
other than through armed insurrection.   For Tutsi at both elite and mass levels, any attempt to 
liberalize or accommodate Hutu demands for political, economic or social power would 
inevitably threaten the Tutsi as a group; therefore the Tutsi became increasingly wedded to 
upholding the system that was exacerbating the root causes of Hutu unrest.  
In this situation where the root causes of conflict were never addressed – and could never 
be addressed without fundamentally altering the structure of government, military and society - 
Hutu increasingly came to understand that they would never share power peacefully. Therefore 
each cycle of violence increased the perceptions of injustice increased felt by the Hutu, both 
those who remained in the country and those in exile. With each wave of violence, the exile 
community increased in numbers and radicalization. On the other side, the Tutsi allied their 
interests with control of the state more and more, and came to fear the almost inevitable backlash 
that would occur if the Hutu ever earned any genuine power. For the Tutsi, therefore, their sense 
of an impending catastrophe increased with every challenge to Tutsi dominance. Thus in the 
wake of each cycle of conflict, each of these dynamics grew more extreme, creating a feedback 
loop that intensified the effects of the core grievances. At the end of each cycle of conflict the 
core issues were not resolved: though “peace” returned and killings ended, each episode ended 
the violence through more repression. 
 
Triggers of the Civil War 
Against this background, the Buyoya regime (1987 – 1993) initiated and completed a political 
transition that culminated in the Hutu party Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu, Front 
for Democracy in Burundi) sweeping provincial and national elections in June 1993.30 Frodebu 
leader Melchior Ndadaye was sworn in as the President in July, and formed a cabinet with 
significant Tutsi representation. The government attempted power sharing in political 
appointments and civil service positions, and had plans to institute “ethnic parity” in the military 
as well. Shortly after the new government began to function, however, a faction of the Burundian 
                                                 
29 Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, 106. 
30 For a comprehensive evaluation of these elections (in English), see Reyntjens, “The Proof of the Pudding is in the 
Eating.” 
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army assassinated the new President and senior Frodebu leaders during a coup attempt in 
October 1993. Hutu and Tutsi both engaged in reciprocal attacks, with a death toll that quickly 
reached into the thousands. The coup itself collapsed after two days and the Chief of Staff of the 
Army ordered the military back to the barracks, though Uprona and other parties that had lost in 
the elections supported the putsch and opposed the international peacekeeping force that the 
government had requested.31 These events triggered significant unrest throughout the country 
and the start of the civil war as more groups joined the fighting on each side. Despite repeated 
efforts at power sharing and another political transition to a civilian government in 2005, the 
fighting did not completely end until January 2009. 
The underlying causes of this war built on the foundations laid since 1965. Prompted by 
pressures from the international community in the wake of the 1988 massacres, and realizing that 
there would be no end to conflict if things did not change, then-President Buyoya initiated a 
transition to a new political dispensation. Essentially, the rapid unfolding of the transition 
between 1988 and 1993 threatened Tutsi elites and masses, many of whom supported the coup in 
October 1993. The rapid pace of reforms threatened Tutsi interests, which feared retaliation and 
repression if the Hutu government were allowed to truly govern. Yet because multiparty politics 
had been opened, when the coup-makers unseated the government, there were Hutu political 
organizations operating within the country. These parties maintained links to communities of 
Hutu spread throughout the region, especially those who were radicalized and in the refugee 
communities, which were capable of mounting armed resistance. This time, therefore, the parties 
could organize, mobilize, and launch a large-scale resistance to military suppression. 
 
Roots of the Crisis: The Transition Period, 1988- 1993 
Following the conflict in June – August 1998, Buyoya had inaugurated a “National Commission 
to Study the Question of National Unity,” and incorporated Hutu into governing structures. The 
Commission published a report that led to sweeping changes, the promulgation of a new 
constitution, and plans to transition to an elected civilian government. According to Burundi 
scholar Filip Reyntjens, genuine change had occurred by the middle of this period: Hutu were 
brought into government at all levels, provided with better educational opportunities, and 
incorporated into the civil service.  
                                                 
31 Ibid.  
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Assessing the situation beyond declarations, texts, and reports, the progress made 
between late 1988 and early I991 was obvious. At the political level, many Hutu 
entered the apparatus of the state: half the number of ministers, a sizeable number 
of provincial governors and mayors, and even the secretary-general of the single 
party Union pour le progres national (Uprona) at the end of 1990 were Hutu. 
Furthermore, they were equally represented with Tutsi in all major state bodies of 
a political nature. A marked improvement likewise occurred in two of three key 
areas where discrimination against the Hutu had been highly visible in the past. 
The first is education, where the by-and-large fair organisation of national 
examinations since I989 has resulted in a considerable increase in the number of 
Hutu having access to secondary and higher education. The second is the civil 
service, whose higher echelons in particular used to be a near monopoly of Tutsi. 
Here again, progress is clear: not only did recruitment procedures become more 
transparent, but the Government took a number of quite voluntarist measures 
aimed at recruiting Hutu into responsible positions, some- times even at the 
expense of incumbent Tutsi.32 
 The problem was that this rapid transition created a security dilemma for the Tutsi, felt 
most acutely by those in elite positions within the government and military. Tutsi social, 
economic and political elites found the pace of the changes too drastic. This especially surfaced 
in the areas of land reform, civil service and the military.33 Tutsi feared losing civil service 
appointments to the hordes of Hutu that they anticipated would return from abroad, while 
reforms to address economic inequality and land reform threatened to return land to Hutu who 
had lost their possessions in the wake of the 1972 genocide. There would be an inevitable shift in 
the distribution of national resources as the government incorporated more Hutu. The Tutsi 
acknowledged that these shifts had to occur, but the pace at which they were happening was too 
abrupt. The situation worsened towards the end of the five-year transitional period, when the 
pace of refugee returns increased following the Tanzanian government’s decision to force 
                                                 
32Ibid., p. 564-5. 
33 Daniel Sullivan, “The Missing Pillars: A Look at the Failure of Peace in Burundi through the Lens of Arend 
Lijphart’s Theory of Consociational Democracy,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 1 (March 2005): 
75-96. 
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refugees to repatriate to Burundi or to become Tanzanian citizens. This caused further pressures 
on the already overburdened carrying capacity of agricultural land and government services. 
Tutsi masses also feared that pursuing ethnic parity in the military would remove the only 
guarantor of their physical security, as they regarded the military their only protection from 
violent domination by the Hutu majority. “The Tutsi fear was that if control of the army were 
given to the Hutu, or even if a move were made in that direction, it would result in the ‘Rwanda 
syndrome,” referring to the targeting and marginalization of Tutsi by Hutu in Rwanda after they 
gained power in 1959.”34 Across the Tutsi, from elite to the masses, a very strong collective fear 
of the future had manifested. Once Frodebu won over 80% of the seats in the National Assembly, 
the Presidency, and control of almost all regional governments, the future of the Tutsi in Burundi 
would have seemed very tenuous.35  
 Ndadaye’s plans to implement significant structural change in the composition of the 
officer and enlisted ranks of the military also generated significant backlash.  
Entirely under the command of Tutsi officers, most of them from Bururi [a 
region within Burundi historically associated with internal power rivalries within 
the Tutsi community], and with only a fraction of Hutu among the troops, the 
army serves as the lynchpin of Tutsi hegemony…Given the extreme brutality 
displayed by the troops in 1988 and 1991, the Burundi army is obviously the 
institution least likely to tolerate a significant shift in the military and political 
power to the Hutu.36 
In 1988, the military had already been factionalized along clan and regional lines, and had allied 
itself completely with the defense of the Tutsi ideology. Military elites resisted the transition 
and launched unsuccessful coup attempts in February 1989 and March 1992, demonstrating that 
“Buyoya’s message of reconciliation was meeting considerable resistance in penetrating the 
military establishment.”37 When the new President unveiled plans to restructure the military and 
reorient its focus (towards external, rather than internal activities), this served to trigger an 
intervention by certain elements in the military.  
                                                 
34 Sullivan, “The Missing Pillars,” 86. 
35 This is despite the reality that Ndadaye’s cabinet over-represented Tutsi, allocating them over one-third of the 
seats, and that the Prime Minister was Tutsi as well. See Reyntjens, “The Proof is in the Eating,” 579. 
36 Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, 168. 
37 Reyntjens, “Burundi: Prospects for Peace,” 8. 
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 On the other side of the fence, the coup attempt further demonstrated to those involved in 
the Hutu uprising that the system would never change unless several fundamental issues were 
addressed. The core demands of the Hutu uprising in the fall of 1993 were therefore that 
Burundi – or the international community – disband the Tutsi army, rebuild a national army, 
and that an international military force deploy to end the ethnic clashes around the country. 
Politically, these groups wanted a restoration of the 1992 constitution and the government that 
had been elected in June 1993. Finally, they desired to promote Hutu political participation, 
address resource scarcity, and de-militarize society.38  
 Some have argued that on top of all these dynamics the 1993 elections were held too soon 
and forced upon the Burundians by international negotiators.39 As a result, when Frodebu polled 
so well, despite government attempts to prevent the party from fully campaigning, neither side 
was ready to accept defeat; the situation could only have led to bloodshed.  
  
Post-Transition: Failed Power Sharing and Launch of Full-Scale Insurgency 
After the assassination of Frodebu leaders, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) sent in a 
stabilization force and the United Nations led a mediation effort between Frodebu and Uprona. 
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah as the Special 
Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) in charge of the mediation efforts. Ould-
Abdallah brokered an agreement between Uprona and Frodebu, creating a power-sharing 
government called the “Convention of Government” (September 10, 1994).40 Rather than 
restoring Frodebu to power, however, the Convention of Government created a system that 
shared power equally between the Tutsi (Uprona) and Hutu (Frodebu) parties, a compromise 
with which many Hutu both in government and outside, were not happy. In June 1994, Frodebu 
split into moderate and hard-line factions: respectively Frodebu and the Conseil National Pour la 
Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD, National Council for the Defense of Democracy). Led by 
former Minister of the Interior Léonard Nyangoma the CNDD broke away from Frodebu when it 
agreed to allow the abrogation of the 1992 constitution and on the principle of power sharing 
with Uprona. The CNDD opposed this level of cooperation with Uprona, all participation in the 
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39 Jan Van Eck, “Challenges to a Durable Peace in Burundi,” ISS Situation Report (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute 
for Security Studies, April 2004).  
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Convention government, and committed itself to winning back power through violent means. 
The CNDD soon merged with its armed wing, forming the CNDD-FDD (Conseil National Pour 
la Défense de la Démocratie - Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie; National Council for the 
Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy).41  
 The CNDD and Palipehutu-FNL both opposed the power sharing government and 
became the two largest militant groups opposed to the aborted coup of 1993. There were 
multiple, smaller, rebel groups that had formed in exile or which had militarized after the 
elections were overturned. Collectively, these groups did not agree with the basis of the mediated 
government, and felt that the Hutu had once again been deprived of their rightful place in 
Burundian politics. That Uprona had gained a role in government despite losing at the polls, and 
that the military was still vested in protecting Tutsi power, meant that nothing had changed.  
 Between September 1994 and July 1996, the Convention government attempted to rule 
the country in the face of this ongoing insurgency, while the Burundian Army (FAB) waged war 
against the rebel movements. By 1996 the situation had deteriorated and the government was 
unable to stabilize the territory. In that year, Buyoya initiated another coup, overthrowing the 
Convention government and returning the country to military rule. Fighting continued to rage, 
sending refugees back into neighboring countries and destabilizing the entire region.  
 
MEDIATING THE BURUNDIAN CONFLICT 
Since the fighting began in 1993, Burundi has gone through over five separate negotiations 
periods.  
1. 1993 – 1995, UN mediated talks under SRSG Ould-Abdallah; an initiative to mediate 
between Frodebu and Uprona to resolve the crisis that began in 1993. 
2. Fall 1995 – 1996, Carter Center Diplomatic Initiative; an effort to create a regional 
framework to facilitate negotiations for peace and to prevent the spread of war to 
neighboring countries. This model relied on elder statesmen from Africa, supported by 
the United States based Carter Center.  
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3. 1996 – 2000, First Phase of the Regional Framework Arusha Talks (the Arusha Talks), 
facilitated by Julius Nyerere and then Nelson Mandela; regionally-sponsored talks to 
mediate the conflict and bring about peace in the wake of the 1996 coup. 
4. 2000 – 2003, Second Phase of the Arusha Talks - South African led talks separate from 
but officially under the Arusha framework; ceasefire negotiations with Hutu rebels, 
primarily the CNDD-FDD.  
5. 2003 – 2006, South African led talks separate from but officially under the Arusha 
framework; ceasefire negotiations with Palipehutu-FNL.  
This section will discuss the nature of these different rounds of negotiations, focusing on the 
strategies of the lead facilitator, the content of the talks, and any agreements that resulted from 
the talks. Within this section, each series of talks will be analyzed, but most attention will be paid 
to the Arusha framework talks, as this was the most comprehensive and enduring of the 
processes, and culminated in the primary peace accord, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement for Burundi (the Arusha Accord). While culminating in the agreement that 
established a transitional government and led to the installation of a permanent government in 
2005, the Arusha process had significant flaws. First of all, Arusha began talks without a 
ceasefire, which enabled rebel groups to utilize violence as a negotiating tactic. Neither of the 
two principal rebel groups were involved in the process and neither signed the Arusha Accord. 
While the signing of the Arusha Accord was a necessary first step, the exclusive process created 
a need for separate negotiations with the main rebel groups. Second, and more important for this 
project, the Arusha framework focused on process over content, leaving the main questions 
about the design of the future government and military to the transitional regime that was 
selected in 2001.  
The negotiations for ceasefire with the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL varied in 
certain critical respects on this very point: the ceasefire agreement reached with the CNDD-FDD 
in 2003 provided detailed provisions for how the group’s members would be incorporated into 
the government and the military and for the demobilization of CNDD-FDD fighters. This 
addressed certain root causes that had kept the CNDD-FDD out of the Arusha talks and 
addressed concrete concerns about the composition and role/function of these bodies. As a result 
the inclusion of the CNDD-FDD into the ongoing transition process was relatively smooth and 
culminated with the CNDD-FDD winning control of the government in 2005. When Palipehutu-
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FNL finally signed a ceasefire, however, it was unable to obtain concrete provisions regarding 
how the organization would be incorporated into the government and military structures. South 
African negotiators promised Palipehutu-FNL that their core issues would be addressed in 
subsequent talks; a process that the Burundian government reneged upon. Therefore, while 
Palipehutu initially signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government of Burundi it 2006, it did 
not stop fighting until January 2009. 
  
 UN Mediation Efforts Under SRSG Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, November 1993 – 
September 2005 
After Ndadaye’s assassination in October 1993, the United Nations quickly moved to mediate 
between Frodebu and Uprona. These negotiations aimed to arrive at a short-term solution to the 
political impasse and end the clashes that had sprung up around the country. The effort had four 
goals: to restore democratic institutions, facilitate dialogue between Uprona and Frodebu, to 
establish a commission of inquiry into the coup and the massacres, and to work with the OAU 
intervention force. SRSG Ould-Abdallah was chosen as an eminent African whose country 
(Mauritania) was not involved in the larger regional dynamic, and who therefore should have 
been viewed as an impartial mediator.  
 The UN mediation took place in two separate rounds, November 1993 – January 1994 
and then the summer – fall 1994. The initial period led to the drafting of a power sharing 
agreement in January 1994, which aimed to attain an elite-bargain between Frodebu and Uprona. 
The agreement broke down and fighting resumed in March 1994, after which negotiations were 
suspended. Ould-Abdallah was able to restart the dialogue the following summer, when the 
discussions focused on creating a new power sharing agreement. In neither of these periods did 
the participants discuss substantive issues; the focus was on establishing a provisional 
government that would share power between Hutu and Tutsi (Frodebu and Uprona). This 
provisional government would then be tasked with overseeing a return to a permanent civilian 
government.  
 In September 1994, Frodebu and Uprona finally agreed on a power sharing formula and 
agreed to suspend the 1992 constitution. The Convention government would be responsible for 
drafting a new constitution and to initiate public debate on peaceful coexistence (this provision 
was meant to deal with the “national unity” question, Burundian code for the Hutu-Tutsi 
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conflict).42 The Convention of Government provided near-parity in power sharing: 55% of 
government posts were assigned to Hutu and 45% to Tutsi. Ould-Abdallah’s negotiation team 
had deemed this the formula that would most likely restore some stability to Burundi, as it would 
ensure the buy-in of the Tutsi elite. Unfortunately, the over-representation of Tutsi further 
inflamed the Hutu rebel parties and many refused to support the Convention. They also opposed 
the abrogation of the 1992 constitution. 
 The governing coalition soon proved unstable, and the opposition to the Convention 
agreement raised questions about the usefulness of the UN mediation efforts. Boutros-Ghali 
appointed a second envoy to the Great Lakes region to serve as mediator, indicating that the UN 
similarly had doubts about Ould-Abdallah’s mediation focus. In September 1995 Ould-Abdallah 
resigned, claiming that he was not given the tools necessary to conduct his job and therefore 
could not continue as the lead negotiator. In reality, he had never been able to marginalize 
extremists in the discussions, which he had identified as one of his main goals.43 In the wake of 
the collapse of the UN efforts, violence escalated throughout 1995.  
 The UN mediation focused primarily on restoring stability rather than addressing the 
issues that prompted the October 1993 coup. By focusing on process and the establishment of a 
new transitional government the mediation appeased the Tutsi, but failed to address any of the 
core concerns of the Hutu. Many Hutu saw the Convention government as conceding to the 
demands of Tutsi who had resisted transferring power to a majoritarian government. The 
resistance saw nothing wrong with the 1992 constitution, and did not see why it should have 
been overturned. There was no discussion or provision for an international military monitoring 
force, which left the Burundian army with the ability to continue to attack Hutu civilians. In the 
minds of the resistance the Convention government allowed the coup to succeed through 
international mediation, and threatened to prolong the unfair system of rule had fomented 
conflict since 1965.  
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Carter Center Diplomatic Initiative, 1995-1996 
The Carter Center Diplomatic Initiative was not quite a peace mediation per se, as it did not 
attempt to bring Frodebu, Uprona, the Burundian military and smaller militarized groups 
together to negotiate an end to the crisis. Rather, the Carter Center initiative worked with 
regional actors to establish a framework that in turn could facilitate negotiations for peace and 
help prevent the spread of war to neighboring countries. The model utilized involved a core of 
advisors from the Carter Center, based in Atlanta, Georgia, who recruited and worked with a 
group of eminent elder statesmen from around Africa: Ahmoud Toure from Mali, the Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu from South Africa; and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. The discussions were not 
specifically about the conflict itself, but about how the region could and should respond to put 
pressure on the combatants and deal with the regional destabilization caused by the refugee 
exodus and arms trafficking.44  
 The initiative took place in two meetings, the Cairo Summit (November 1995) and the 
Tunis Summit (March 1996). Each meeting was facilitated by the Carter Center, Toure, Tutu and 
Nyerere, and discussed the situations in both Rwanda and Burundi. 45 Attendees at both summits 
included the Burundian Government (the Convention government), and representatives from 
Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. In Cairo, the participants focused on creating a regional 
consultative framework for conflict resolution, and focused discussion on pertinent regional 
issues: refugee repatriation, cross border raids by the FAB and insurgents, and arms trafficking 
by militia groups in refugee camps Tanzania and Zaire. At the second meeting, the participants 
discussed the situation in Burundi in particular, articulating the need for a debate on a democratic 
constitution, national reconciliation, and reforms to the security forces. At the end of the Tunis 
meeting, the Burundian delegation pledged to end insecurity in the country and consented to 
Nyerere’s appointment as the lead for a subsequent regional effort to mediate the conflict. This 
established the framework for the Arusha talks, which took place over the next two years. It also 
established a stable framework for regional governments to coordinate their actions with respect 
to the Burundi conflict, which later proved effective in coordinating regional sanctions against 
Burundi.  
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Regional Framework Arusha Talks, 1996 – 2000 
The real process of peace negotiations began with the regional initiative to bring the warring 
parties together under the rubric of the Arusha Talks. The formal multi-party talks took place 
primarily between 1996 and 2000, first facilitated by Julius Nyerere and then former South 
African President Nelson Mandela (following Nyerere’s death from illness in October 1999). 
The formal peace accords were signed in September 2000, without a ceasefire agreement and 
without the participation of the two main rebel groups at that time, the CNDD-FDD and 
Palipehutu-FNL. These peace accords focused on laying out principles for the creation of peace 
in Burundi and on establishing the structures for a transitional government that would oversee 
the writing of a new constitution and the creation of a permanent, civilian government. As such, 
the peace negotiations focused on basic principles and processes, rather than consideration of the 
deeper issues motivating the crises. The foundational issues were brought in at the later stages of 
the talks, but were not the centerpiece of the talks, as the negotiations did not aim to solve the 
problems in the framework of the talks; but to create a subsequent government that would 
address the issues.  
 The talks proceeded in fits and starts, and in the first two years made little progress.46 
From the first meetings in March 1996 through the April 1997 meeting, the dialogue focused 
solely on preliminaries: establishing dialogue with the parties, followed by talks to set the 
agenda, then discussions on technical issues to stabilize Burundi and reduce fighting. Most of 
these talks broke down without any concrete progress or resolutions, at times because the main 
parties (Frodebu and Uprona) could not agree on which other parties to the conflict should be 
included in the talks, and at other times because regional dynamics derailed the negotiations 
process (such as the initiation of the war in Zaire in July 1996), and finally because by mid-1997, 
relations between the Burundian and Tanzanian government soured the entire negotiations 
framework.47  
 The first round of talks, in March – April 1996, involved the mediation team, Frodebu 
and Uprona. The aim of this session was to engage the two principals in talks about talks, mainly 
to get them working with one another. However, these talks quickly collapsed because of the 
ongoing fighting between the Hutu militia groups and the Burundian army. FRODEBU refused 
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47 Khadiagalia, “Burundi.” 
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to comply with Uprona’s demand that Frodebu condemn the ongoing attacks, which led Uprona 
and the military to accuse Frodebu of complicity with the militants (primarily the CNDD-FDD). 
On its side, Uprona rejected Nyerere’s proposal that the government should negotiate with these 
armed groups.48 The problems of this first meeting pointed to issues that over the following four 
years deeply affected the peace process: whether or not groups still fighting should be included 
in the talks before signing a ceasefire; factionalism within the various groups and how to deal 
with splinter groups once they arose; and the relationship of parties in the talks to those that 
remained outside the negotiating framework. 
Later in June, the first Regional Heads of State Summit convened in Arusha. This 
meeting included heads of state from Tanzania (President Benjamin Mkapa) and Uganda 
(President Yoweri Museveni), as well as Frodebu, Uprona and several smaller parties. These 
talks focused on technical issues, rather than substantive: getting to a ceasefire to allow 
substantive talks, regional security assistance, and mechanisms to restore and prevent further 
violence.49 This session spent a great deal of time discussing the possibility of mobilizing an 
international intervention force, something that Frodebu had been requesting since 1993, but 
which was finally gaining traction from the regional neighbors.50 Mkapa and Museveni in 
particular pressured the Convention government - President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya Frodebu) 
and Prime Minister Antoine Nduwayo (Uprona) to request the international force. 
Ntibantunganya welcomed the creation of the force, while Nduwayo initially bowed to pressure 
and agreed, but later publicly condemned the idea. According to Mthembu-Salter, this pointed to 
another recurring dynamic in the negotiations processes: the mediators were extremely heavy-
handed and forced the participants through negotiations processes and into agreements, whether 
or not there was truly any consensus or minimum agreement.  
The Arusha summit set the tone for much of what followed during Burundi's 
peace process, with Burundian political representatives being pressured by 
regional heads of state into highly controversial agreements that it was then left to 
them to sell to their profoundly sceptical grassroots communities. In this instance, 
the request for international assistance was welcomed by FRODEBU and most 
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other Hutu parties, but vehemently condemned by UPRONA and other Tutsi 
parties. Once back in Burundi, Nduwayo responded to the condemnation by 
shifting his position at a rally and accused Ntibantunganya of a secret agenda to 
neutralise the Burundian army.51  
The prospect of this intervention force, and the opposition from both Uprona and the Burundian 
military, is considered the final trigger for the coup that Buyoya himself launched in early July.52  
Following the coup, the third round of talks (the second Heads of State Summit) opened 
at the end of July 1996. This session was not a facilitation of talks between the parties to the 
conflict; instead this was a meeting of regional actors who had gathered to try to utilize the new 
network they had formed to reduce the intensity of the fighting. During this meeting, the regional 
actors decided to impose economic sanctions to restore constitutional order and legitimacy; 
instead the Buyoya regime launched a counter-insurgency effort against the rebels and 
condemned the sanctions.  
The fighting continued throughout the rest of 1996 and 1997 without any genuine 
negotiations that involved the parties to the conflict. The next Arusha framework talks occurred 
in April 1997. Like the July 1996 meetings, the Third Heads of State Summit involved regional 
actors and again attempted to influence the Burundian conflict through external incentives. Since 
the fighting had not abated and the sanctions had soured relationships between the regional 
actors and the Burundian military and Uprona, the representatives at these talks decided to ease 
the sanctions. Relations between Tanzania and Burundi had greatly deteriorated because of the 
sanctions, which also weakened Nyerere’s position as lead negotiator.53 As Mthembu-Salter, a 
South African journalist covering the negotiations for the Mail and Guardian weekly paper 
described it, “Tutsi politicians … roundly condemn the initiative as a violation of sovereignty 
and akin to a declaration of war and most see it as proof of the hostile intent of Nyerere and the 
Tanzanian government. Many have commented that since then they never again viewed Nyerere 
as a neutral mediator, but instead as a party to the conflict.”54 Nyerere offered to step down as 
lead facilitator in May 1997, but the regional actors refused to accept his resignation. 
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Fourth Arusha Talks: June – July 1998 
Substantive talks about resolving the crisis only began in June 1998, when the parties finally 
returned to the negotiating table. Nineteen delegations participated in the Arusha talks, 17 from 
political parties and one each from the government and national assembly.55 These talks, 
however, almost derailed because the CNDD and Palipehutu split into political and military 
wings on the eve of the negotiations, which caused a crisis about which of the groups to include 
in the talks.  Should each of the four factions participate in the talks, or just one faction from 
each group? If one, which was the “legitimate” voice of the movement? Each faction claimed to 
be the true voice of the group.  
Nyerere gave the groups three options – reconcile, put just the old leaders forward, put 
the new leaders forward. But this led to deadlock; both camps in each formation considered 
themselves to be the true voice of the group and would not compromise, while the Burundian 
government opposed the participation of any groups that refused to cease fighting.56 Ultimately 
Nyerere decided that the original leaders, at the head now of political organizations shrift of their 
armed wings, would represent their parties at the talks.57 
Therefore right from the beginning, the issue of inclusion created serious problems for 
the talks. There was a genuine legitimacy issue regarding which camps were represented and 
which excluded from the process, and this generated a climate of mistrust that poisoned the 
discussions. “Keeping Jean Bosco’s faction [the breakaway, armed wing of the CNDD-FDD] 
outside the formal negotiations has undermined the entire process: the climate of suspicion and 
mistrust between all parties, and within the parties themselves, has increased.”58  
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Nyerere’s decree also excluded any groups waging armed conflict, and so CNDD-FDD 
and Palipehutu-FNL remained outside the negotiations framework through October 1999, when 
the facilitation passed to (former) President Nelson Mandela. Mandela attempted to bring the two 
into the talks, but for various reasons relating to the weakened position they would find 
themselves in and their inability to shape the agenda at that point, both remained outside the 
process.59 The CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL thus became two spoilers that continued to 
fight, while the other groups in the conflict attempted to resolve the situation. The final Arusha 
protocols that were later signed in September 2000 did not include either group, so the South 
Africans continued separate talks with each group for years after the main peace accord was 
promulgated. 
Once the talks resumed in mid-June, Nyerere’s facilitation team split the discussions into 
five separate committees that were tasked with specific topics and agenda items.60  
- Nature of the conflict – this committee was responsible for creating a document that 
outlined the nature of the conflict, the problems of genocide and exclusion, and proposing 
solutions to these; 
- Democracy and good governance – strategies for democracy and good governance; 
- Peace and security – strategies for achieving pace and security for all; 
− Reconstruction and economic development – measures for economic reconstruction and 
development; and  
− Guarantees for the application of a peace agreement. 
By splitting the work into smaller, functionally focused groups, the facilitators were able to focus 
the talks within each issue areas and to break down complex issues into manageable pieces. This 
framework also helped to neutralize critiques of the dominance of Tanzanians in the process.61 
Content versus Process 
These committees were establishing interim, civilian-controlled structures that would oversee the 
final transition back to civilian rule. Where there were substantive discussions, therefore, they 
applied mainly to the formation of the transitional government, rather than the permanent one. 
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There are indications that both the decision to focus on technical arrangements and principles 
during the negotiations and the choice to task subsequent institutions with the burden of 
responding to fundamental causes may have been the expedient course of action, due to the 
intractability of certain fundamental issues. As discussed earlier, when an issue cannot be 
discussed constructively in the context of the negotiations, the parties to the talks may decide that 
it is better to postpone the resolution to a later stage. This is apparently what happened in several 
of the committees in the Arusha discussions held during the summer of 1999.  Based on 
participant observation of the meetings in June – July 1998, Elisa Renda observed that when the 
peace and security committee attempted to set the agenda, delegates got so mired in arguments 
about what to include that the group made no progress in three weeks of discussions.62 When the 
group tasked with discussing the nature of the conflict experienced a similar problem – 
participants could not even agree on the definition of genocide – the facilitators shifted the entire 
conversation to solutions, as this was apparently easier to discuss than the nature of the conflict 
itself.  
Not only did the facilitators shift the conversation, they also shifted the burden for the 
ultimate resolution to structures that would be established later in the peace process. “On the part 
of the facilitating team, it was clear that the debate could only achieve a constructive result in 
determining ‘solutions’ to the issues of genocide and exclusion. In other words, agreement could 
be reached on the development of independent organs responsible for the ambitious historical 
reconstruction.”63 Renda argues that the facilitators and members of the committee on peace and 
security agreed that since they could not agree on these basics, they deemed that the best way to 
proceed was to “give an independent institution the responsibility of unveiling the country’s 
bloody history.” Similarly, the committee on democracy and governance could not resolve 
justice issues, and therefore “agreed with the UN Security Council that an international 
Commission of Judicial Enquiry and the creation of a National Commission of Truth and 
Reconciliation were the only solutions.”64   
These choices may have been necessary to move the negotiations process along, but they 
came with a price. Two of the core issues that motivated Palipehutu-FNL had not been 
addressed, which led the organization to maintain it fight long after every other Hutu movement 
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had lain down arms (these were an open discussion of the nature of all the conflicts that had 
preceded the 1993 war and the nature of how past injustices would be addressed). Eight years 
later, when Palipehutu-FNL finally engaged in ceasefire negotiations, the organization put both 
of these issues on the agenda.   
 Unfortunately even with these coping mechanisms the committees made little progress 
between June 1998 and January 1999. The negotiations framework broke down in the spring of 
1999 and parties only came back to the table when international sanctions compelled them.65 It 
was another nine months before any committees showed genuine progress towards concrete 
proposals. When they did draft proposals, these were for the transitional government, which 
would then oversee a final transition and drafting of a new constitution.66 At the time of 
Nyerere’s death in October 1999, draft agreements had been reached on the necessity of the 
formation of a democratic regime, the basics of an electoral system for the future, and that a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission should be established. 
 
Mandela Takes Over, October 1999 
Nyerere’s death opened up a window of opportunity for the Burundian government. It had long 
been trying to remove the negotiations process from regional control, particularly that of 
Tanzania. On December 1, 1999, a regional heads of state summit selected former South African 
President Nelson Mandela as the lead facilitator. Mandela immediately took the negotiations in a 
different direction. His approach was much more heavy-handed than had been Nyerere’s; 
Mandela personally met with all the parties to the conflict, including the CNDD-FDD and 
Palipehutu-FNL, and he openly admonished all sides whenever they prevaricated. A relative 
outsider and with little knowledge of Burundi before this point, Mandela visited the country and 
rapidly caught up on the situation through consultations and reading.67  
When he approached the situation, therefore, it was without the traditional assumptions 
and interests of a regional actor. Mandela drew parallels between Burundi and South Africa 
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during apartheid and South Africa’s subsequent negotiations process, and used the South African 
experience as a model for the rest of the negotiations. This influenced his approach: he tended to 
treat Uprona and Frodebu as the two main negotiating partners in the process, the way that the 
National Party and African National Congress had been the “real” focus of the South African 
negotiation in the early 1990s. Also, Mandela frequently and publicly likened the Tutsi to white 
South Africans, drawing parallels between a 15% minority population systematically repressing 
and disenfranchising the 85% majority population. While this provided a fresh lens to the 
negotiations process, it also alienated some Tutsi elements, who resented what they saw as 
Mandela’s dogmatic mapping of the South African situation onto Burundi.  
Mandela also focused on inclusion, arguing that all stakeholders in the conflict needed to 
be at the negotiating tables. He made great efforts to bring in CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL 
into the process, meeting with the leaders of the movements. Nyerere’s exclusion of these groups 
had continued to threaten any progress made, but including them at this point was also 
precarious. There was a genuine potential for rivalry between the Hutu politicians who had been 
participating and the armed Hutu rebels who claimed to be appropriate personalities to negotiate 
security sector reform. Along with this, Frodebu’s position as the lead Hutu organization could 
have been threatened had either the CNDD-FDD or Palipehutu-FNL (but more the CNDD-FDD) 
truly joined the process; this increased Frodebu’s opposition to including the rebels without a 
ceasefire guarantee.68 In the end, while the CNDD-FDD participated in some of the talks under 
Mandela, it ultimately withdrew and refused full participation. Palipehutu-FNL’s leaders never 
came to the table at all. Mandela subsequently branded them terrorist organizations, which only 
served to further alienate them from the process.  
Mandela’s approach was almost authoritarian; he doggedly focused on process, timelines 
and sticking to both.69 In order to help participants stick to the final deadline, Mandela “pre-
booked” international actors, like then-President Bill Clinton, to attend the peace accord signing 
ceremony that was set for September 2000. He then used the public embarrassment that would be 
caused to keep the process on track and prevent parties from stalling. Van Eck asserted that 
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Mandela used his international stature and moral force to “bully” the process through, which he 
argued no other mediator could have done.70  
Along with his deadline-focused approach, Mandela used his moral authority to force the 
Burundians to confront issues that, to this point in the negotiations, they had avoided. “By his 
unaccommodating approach to the conflict and his reminder to the Burundian political class that 
they must show a sense of responsibility, he has provoked a healthy debate on questions related 
to an amnesty for those guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the integration of 
rebel forces into the army, power sharing and the transition.”71 Until this point, the Burundians 
had used euphemism, allusions and half-expressed sentiments when discussing the past and the 
nature of the conflict; or they had avoided discussing the core issues altogether.  
In terms of process, Mandela’s facilitation team divided the participants into three camps: 
an extreme pro-Hutu, extreme pro-Tutsi, and a moderate camp. The logic in dividing the groups 
into this way was to allow each group to come up with its own proposals, and then through a 
series of bilateral negotiations between the facilitators and each group, to bring the outlier and 
more radical proposals closer to the position of the moderate camp.72 This technique was 
designed to sideline extremist elements in the talks and focus on technical issues that prevented 
grandstanding and politicking. Mandela’s team also removed the five-part committee structure as 
a way to generate proposals. Instead, his team worked with Burundian parties in the three groups 
to draft an agreement, which he then presented to all the parties in July 2000. Mandela then gave 
the groups three weeks to come up with counter-proposals for the draft, and through this process 
they worked on revising the draft document and coming up with the final peace accords that 19 
parties signed in August and September 2000.  
 
Content vs. Process 
Analysts of the Burundian peace process laud the protocols signed in September for pushing the 
peace process forward and initiating the transitional government, but note that several aspects of 
the process generated ripple effects that, farther on, have endangered the transition. Several of 
these have already been mentioned, so here we will focus on those that have not been discussed.  
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Jan van Eck, one of the South African facilitators, has been particularly critical of the 
Arusha Accord and of Mandela’s approach in particular. Van Eck faults the Mandela phase of 
negotiations for violating all the principles of peacemaking that had been developed over 
decades of practice and research: inclusivity, compromise, ownership of the process, home 
grown solution, dealing with root causes, and reconciliation (emphasis added). While Mandela 
himself asserted that this flaunting of the rules was what allowed him to conclude the talks on 
schedule and with a signed peace agreement, van Eck felt that this may not have allowed for 
airing of grievances, many parties felt forced to sign the final accord and did not have time to 
dialogue about the provisions of the accord.73 
Of these principles, the lack of ownership and avoidance of root causes seem to have 
created the most follow-on difficulties that the peace process has encountered since Arusha. For 
one, a significant number of groups – both signatories and non-signatories - subsequently voiced 
vigorous opposition to many provisions in the agreement. A number of Tutsi parties had initially 
even refused to sign, but under intense pressure were convinced to sign it in early September 
before the final international ceremony. Similarly, the two main rebel groups capitalized on 
opposition to the agreement to sustain their fighting; the CNDD-FDD only acceded to the accord 
after it signed the ceasefire agreement in 2003, and one of its splinter factions held out until 
2005. 74 
These groups were then able to use their “principled” stand against the Arusha protocol 
as campaign tools in the transitional elections in 2005. Lemarchand argues that the CNDD-FDD 
capitalized on their opposition to the Mandela-phase and the text of the agreement as campaign 
platforms, and used this as a wedge issue to defeat Frodebu in the elections held between June 
and August 2005. By distancing itself from the Arusha framework negotiations and the final 
document, the CNDD-FDD was able to position itself as a more legitimate political force that 
stood up to its ideals and resisted pressure from the international community.   
Overlooking root causes and forcing the process also extended the conflict in this 
situation. The exclusion of major and minor rebel groups, and then their dissatisfaction with the 
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process-oriented agreement, caused the process to drag on for almost an entire decade more, 
requiring near constant side negotiations with multiple parties outside the formal talks (1996 – 
2000). This lack of inclusion prolonged both the war and the peace process.  
Finally, the Accord itself has been faulted for being short on detail and limited in scope.75  
The facilitators and main actors engaged in two days of intense negotiations before the signature 
deadline of 28 August in order to resolve unfinished business, which either resulted in multiple 
compromises that had not been negotiated or briefed to the wider audience, or in incomplete 
protocols with no substantive agreements.76 Only three of the protocols were complete; the rest 
were signed on the date but without specifics as the parties could not come to any agreement. 
The completed protocols pertained to the nature of the conflict, principles of democracy and 
good governance to be included in a post-transition Constitution, and reconstruction and 
development. Critically, the negotiating teams were unable to devise concrete proposals related 
to the security sector, due to the absence of the main rebel groups. The protocol assigned the 
organization and function of the future defense force to national legislation post-transition.  
Many have argued that Mandela forced Burundian politicians to sign an incomplete 
agreement, while Lemarchand criticized the agreement because “much of the agenda inscribed in 
the protocols did not go beyond the stage of pious intentions.”77  He noted that six years after the 
Protocol had been signed, most had yet to be implemented, outside of the areas of democracy 
and governance, and the protocol on peace and security. The transitional arrangements that 
Arusha created ignored several root problems fomenting Burundi’s conflicts: lack of economic 
opportunities, regionalism, and the role and function of the military.78 None of these issues were 
incorporated into the interim government created by the Arusha agreement. Had the document 
been more focused on substance and less on technical arrangements and deadlines, some of these 
deficiencies could have been remedied. 
Despite the drawbacks, there were undeniable positive achievements that did reflect 
attention to root causes. The ICG praised the “clear and precise action programme” outlined in 
the three completed protocols of the agreement – on democracy, reconciliation and 
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reconstruction.79 The transitional structures set a pattern that the constitution drafters elected to 
retain in the final constitution, and the parallel ceasefire negotiations with the CNDD-FDD 
helped to create a security establishment that finally included Hutu as well as Tutsi (though the 
Tutsi remained dominant). Lemarchand concedes that institutionalizing ethnic parity within the 
army may have been the “most remarkable achievement of the Arusha conference.”80 Other 
scholars argued that the over-representation of Tutsi was not a drawback: while it would have 
been truly equitable to implement genuine ethnic proportionality in the military, this would have 
been too much for the Tutsi to accept. 
 One final aspect of the Arusha agreement that bears on the conflict resolution versus 
crisis response debate is whether a ceasefire should have been signed before the peace accords. 
The Arusha process was supplemented by parallel negotiations with warring parties to obtain a 
ceasefire arrangement. This left organizations with substantial military power outside the 
political process, where they could utilize violence to gain concessions in the political arena 
when the agreements and processes did not suit them.81 The CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL 
would not agree to participate in the political process for all the reasons outlined previously, 
several of which were root-cause issues. This then raises the dilemma once again: would 
incorporating root causes into the substantive negotiations have prevented these groups from 
becoming spoilers? The question might be moot, in large part because the Tutsi-dominated 
military would not allow those issues to be brought into the negotiations framework. The 
tradeoff chosen by the mediators was to push ahead and focus on one set of root causes, the 
political process (thereby addressing a root cause), while excluding others, such as the nature and 
composition of the military. Facilitators could not force the spoilers into the peace process, 
which extended the violent phase of the conflict for several years.  
 
Pretoria Sessions 
On balance, however, the Arusha accord roundly failed to curtail violence in the country; instead 
violence spiked in the four months following the signing of the accord. “In fact, since 28 August 
2000, Burundi has experienced a dramatic resurgence of violence, the peace process appears to 
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be paralysed by the refusal of the main rebel groups to take part in it despite the efforts of the 
South African mediators, and the daily life of Burundians both inside and outside the country has 
not been improved at all.”82 The ICG blames the violence on the way that the agreement was 
signed and the importance of the unresolved issues – the ceasefire and the transition process 
itself.  
Ceasefire negotiations separate from the political discussions of the Arusha process had 
been initiated in August 2000. Initially with both the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, the talks 
with the CNDD-FDD initially were more fruitful than those with Palipehutu-FNL. Both 
organizations were pressing for issues relating to the demobilization and/or integration of their 
fighters into the political process and new security forces, as well as the basic structure, role and 
composition of the armed forces post-transition.  Additionally, they were unhappy with the 
compromises enshrined in the Arusha agreement, especially those pertaining to the treatment of 
history, status of post-conflict justice mechanisms, and the overrepresentation of Tutsi in 
transitional government structures and the post-transition military.  
Little progress was made between August 2000 and February 2002, when the South 
African facilitation team requested Tanzania help bring the rebels to the negotiating table. 
During this time, the transitional government and Burundian army were fighting the various 
rebel movements throughout the Burundian territory. Complicating matters, an internal division 
within the CNDD-FDD blossomed into a split, with the National Council of Patriots (FDD-CNP) 
establishing itself as a separate movement in October 2001. According to the ICG, the FDD-CNP 
soon grew stronger than Palipehutu-FNL.83  
The Tanzanian government and the CNDD-FDD factions began a dialog at the end of 
July. Palipehutu-FNL and some of the CNDD-FDD factions did not consider the Burundian 
government selected at the beginning of the transition in November 2001 to be legitimate. 
Instead they asserted that they could only negotiate with the Burundian army, which was the real 
power in the country.84 Multiple rounds of talks were held during 2002, though no tangible 
progress in terms of defining an agenda and obtaining participation was made until the following 
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year. In 2003, the CNDD-FDD factions finally agreed to facilitation by South Africans, led by 
Jacob Zuma. Palipehutu-FNL did not agree and only began to negotiate for a ceasefire later on.  
The final sessions where substantive negotiations and progress took place occurred in 
three meetings, a Heads of State Summit in Dar es Salaam in September 2003, followed by 
South African facilitated principals’ negotiations in Pretoria, South Africa, in September and 
November 2003. The heads of State Summit in Dar es Salaam had derailed because neither the 
transitional government nor the CNDD-FDD factions would compromise on defense power 
sharing and military reform.85  
When the parties met again in Pretoria, President Thabo Mbeki himself led the mediation 
effort. Mbeki used proposals that had been created for the September summit to structure the 
agenda. These ceasefire negotiations focused on the substantive issues that were keeping the 
CNDD-FDD out of the transitional process: political power sharing, defense power sharing, and 
security power sharing. This first Pretoria Session produced the “Protocol on Political, Defence 
and Security Power Sharing in Burundi.” The document contained concrete proposals and 
formulas for the incorporation of CNDD-FDD members in each of these realms; proposed a 
name change for the military (creating the Burundi National Defence Force, BNDF/NDF); and 
established power sharing in the police, gendarmerie, militia and intelligence arms of the security 
sector.  
The participants in the first Pretoria Session made significant headway in resolving the 
issues that had kept the CNDD-FDD out of the process until this point. They were not able to 
come to agreements on temporary immunity for CNDD-FDD members or the status of the 
organization as a political party. These issues were therefore the focus of a follow-on meeting in 
November 2003, which resulted in two further agreements, again both substantive. The “Protocol 
on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi,” and the 
“Forces Technical Agreement” (FTA) resolved the remaining issues. The Protocol on 
Outstanding Issues granted temporary immunity and agreed that the CNDD-FDD would qualify 
to register as a political party once FDD began demobilization. The two-part Forces Technical 
Agreement (1) specified the size, composition, structure and organization of the new BNDF, and 
(2) established the BNDF and provided for a DDR process that would unfold in a year-plus 
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timeline. Significantly, these provisions also articulated how the Transitional Government of 
Burundi would be restructured to incorporate CNDD-FDD members (four ministerial posts, one 
vice presidency, etc).  
The detailed and comprehensive nature of these three agreements created a process that 
led to the successful disarmament and demobilization of the CNDD-FDD and its transformation 
into a political force. The organization did not have unresolved issues at the conclusion of these 
processes, and the factions that had broken off were brought into the process in separate ceasefire 
agreements in 2005. The movement was able to demobilize and transform enough that when the 
final phases of the transition unfolded, the CNDD-FDD won control of the National Assembly, 
the Presidency and many of the provincial governments.   
 
Ceasefire Accord (CFA) with the FNL 
The situation for Palipehutu-FNL was much different than for the CNDD-FDD. Palipehutu-FNL 
had split into three factions by 2003, which complicated the negotiations process, especially 
regarding demobilization and disarmament.86 Furthermore, once the FDD had signed its 
ceasefire, it had begun to cooperate with the Burundian army to fight the FNL. While negotiators 
for the CNDD-FDD ceasefire had often described the FNL as “a small problem,”87 it was 
nevertheless able to threaten the stabilization that Burundi so desperately needed. By late 2006, 
observers noted that “in spite of [the] nonstop negotiations [with Palipehutu-FNL] and the 
holding of democratic elections in August 2005, few Burundians and international role players 
would be brave enough to claim that the Burundian peace process has been completed and that 
Burundi has finally achieved durable peace.”88  
The very nature of the Arusha process created this situation where Burundi had not yet 
achieved a durable peace six years after the Arusha Accord had been signed. Ongoing fighting 
had created a steady decline in the standard of living, which had already been low by 
international standards in 1993, and by 2006 public services had collapsed across most of the 
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country.89 The political situation was normalizing, with a Hutu rebel movement-turned political 
party finally leading the country, and reconstruction and development beginning, but armed 
conflict still plagued western parts of the country where Palipehutu-FNL was still active.  
In the summer of 2006, therefore, international negotiators increased the pressure on 
Palipehutu-FNL to come to a ceasefire agreement with the newly-elected Government of 
Burundi.  The Tanzanian government particularly helped to push Palipehutu-FNL’s leader, 
Agathon Rwasa, back to the negotiating table because Tanzania wanted to close the remaining 
refugee camps and either repatriate the Burundians to Burundi, or make them citizens of 
Tanzania. The talks began in June 2006 in Pretoria, facilitated by the South African Minister for 
Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula. The aim of the discussions was to secure a ceasefire 
agreement and bring Palipehutu-FNL attacks to an end; Palipehutu-FNL participants presented 
several core issues for discussion that were pushed out of the negotiations process.  
These negotiations focused on obtaining agreement to a ceasefire rather than addressing 
issues of fundamental concern to Palipehutu-FNL. Some of the initial reasons that Palipehutu-
FNL had gone to war in 1993 had been resolved with the transition in 2005 and the initiation of 
security sector reform, but there were other issues that had developed over the course of the 
conflict. These were issues similar in spirit to the ones that originated the war, but which had 
evolved with the changing circumstances. Of particular importance, Palipehutu-FNL had 
consistently rejected the Arusha Accord, arguing that the nature of the power-sharing 
arrangements and Uprona’s continuing control over the security establishment merely disguised 
a perpetuation of Tutsi power. By the time the interim government was transitioning to the 
permanent government, Palipehutu-FNL also desired to negotiate for the status of their members 
the political realm and FNL fighters in the security forces and demobilization programs after the 
ceasefire.  
This represents a mix of root causes and issues that arose during the course of the 
conflict. Regarding the composition of the military, the peace agreements signed in 2000 and 
2003 had left Uprona with a “significant level” of control over the military, to which Palipehutu-
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FNL objected.90 In their minds, allowing Uprona a controlling influence in the military would 
perpetuate the political dominance of the old ruling party, as well as Tutsi control over the 
military, which had been one of the foundational problems causing the war in the first place. This 
general balance remained even after the CNDD-FDD integrated into the military after 2003, 
when the Uprona/Tutsi elements were still over-represented; Palipehutu-FNL leaders wanted to 
change the ratio and decrease Tutsi over-representation. Palipehutu-FNL leaders did not want to 
lay down arms without changing the balance in the new Burundian Army.  
On the government’s side, the CNDD-FDD government initially preferred to pursue a 
military solution to the Palipehutu-FNL problem and would accept nothing but unconditional 
surrender.91 The two organizations had been rival rebel movements for years, and the CNDD-
FDD did not want to let Palipehutu-FNL score any political points through a substantive peace 
agreement. CNDD-FDD was also concerned with internal divisions that had cropped up since 
winning the elections, and could not afford to be seen as conceding to Palipehutu-FNL 
demands.92 Soon after taking power, therefore, the CNDD-FDD government under President 
Nkurunziza focused on fighting Palipehutu-FNL, and only agreed to return to the negotiating 
table after Tanzania led a regional initiative to convince both parties to engage in dialogue.  
During the negotiations, the integration of the FNL into the defense and security issues 
proved to be one of the major issues and obstacles to progress. Palipehutu-FNL demanded a 
complete overhaul of the defense and security sector. Tutsi elements in the security sector 
obviously opposed any further dilution of their power, while the CNDD-FDD also resisted this 
demand as its members were now part of the forces that Palipehutu-FNL demanded be 
reorganized. Furthermore, this issue was more complicated because it would be the second 
significant overhaul of the security sector since the transition had begun. The incorporation of 
the CNDD-FDD fighters into the defense and security sectors in 2003 had already necessitated 
that the transitional arrangements agreed to at the signing of the Arusha Accord be modified to 
include the CNDD-FDD. Palipehutu-FNL’s demands would now take positions away not just 
from the Tutsi in the defense and security sectors, but also the newly-transitioned CNDD-FDD 
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combatants.93  Therefore, not including the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL in the initial peace 
accords, made the entire process more difficult and prone to problems: the delicate and 
negotiated balance between Tutsi and Hutu, former government and former militant, had to be 
renegotiated every time one of the combatants signed a ceasefire and agreed to demobilize and 
integrate. 
As with the Arusha process that “ended” the war in 2000, certain issues proved too 
difficult to work out in the context of a negotiating framework that operated with a high degree 
of international pressure and with a focus on a strict deadline. As occurred with some of the 
thorniest issues in the earlier negotiations, as the facilitators promoted dialog between the 
CNDD-FDD government and Palipehutu-FNL, they eliminated certain issues from discussion in 
order to reach an agreement. Thus the focus was on technicalities rather than the substantive 
outcomes that the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in its 2007 report on the peace process. 
Reflecting the nature of the agreement signed on September 7, 2006, the ICG described it as 
“purely technical agreement [that] seemed more like a surrender than a genuine peace 
agreement.”94  
In this last case, the South African mediators convinced Palipehutu-FNL leaders to sign 
the ceasefire by promising that the issues would be taken up subsequently. The parties did not 
devise a particular formula for FNL integration, and the timetable they devised in the second 
round of negotiations (late June – August 2006) gave only one month for FNL demobilization, 
compared to the 13 months provided for the same process for the FDD fighters of the CNDD-
FDD.95 The problem, once again, was that the Burundian government had made no moves to 
initiate talks on the remaining issues by January 2007, as the international pressure was off and 
the government now out of the limelight. The government and international actors asserted that 
Palipehutu-FNL should take up these issues with the Joint Verification and Monitoring 
Mechanism (JVMM) that the June agreement on principles had created; but the JVMM chairman 
refused to allow Palipehutu-FNL to raise any topics not written into the principles document or 
the official ceasefire agreement.96  Palipehutu-FNL therefore did not adhere to the provisions, 
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and fighting continued for another two years with little progress towards implementing the 
ceasefire.  
The South Africans facilitated more rounds of negotiations, and even got both sides (the 
CNDD-FDD government and Palipehutu-FNL) to sign a document “reaffirming” the principles 
of the 2006 CFA, but this did little to decrease the fighting. The parties made no progress 
towards implementing the ceasefire until January 2009, when Palipehutu-FNL finally agreed to 
drop the “Palipehutu” part of the organization’s name and register as the FNL political party.97 
Only after this did the organization begin to demobilize and convert into a purely political 
formation. Three years had passed between the initial signing of the CFA and the beginning of 
its implementation, four years into the first term of the new civilian government led by the 
CNDD-FDD, and one and a half years before the next round of elections were scheduled (June 
2010).  
 
EFFECTS OF CRISIS RESPONSE VS. CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES 
What is clear from this case is that negotiations to end conflict are an iterative process. Burundi, 
like South Africa, and many other states experiencing conflicts that ended through negotiations, 
had to go through a complicated and multifaceted peace process. Preliminary talks to establish 
dialogue between warring parties were followed by talks to set the agenda for subsequent talks 
that would tackle substantive issues. None of the talks that focused on conflict termination 
seemed to have a measurable effect on the conflict (UN talks, Carter Center Talks, and the first 
rounds of the Arusha talks); with the effect that the conflict underwent years of mediation 
without any decrease in the intensity of fighting. Once substantive talks that addressed some of 
the core issues finally began, in June 1999, the exclusion of certain parties and issues from the 
agenda meant that the negotiations process created an incomplete peace accord that had to be 
supplemented through various side-negotiations.  
Ultimately the most fundamental of the core issues (the formula for power sharing and 
the composition, role and function of the military), were delegated to a subsequent domestic 
process that unfolded outside the realm of third-party mediation: the transitional government 
established through the Arusha framework. This transitional government was successful at 
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resolving the conflict to some degree, as the country transitioned to a new regime in August 
2005. This is where the fact that third-parties were not able to get the Burundian factions to 
discuss core political and military issues during the negotiations process becomes important. The 
Tutsi-dominated military remained powerful through the transitional period during which the 
final constitution was drafted. As a result, the transitional government created a permanent 
government and military that over-represents Tutsi. This could potentially reproduce the 
dynamics that have fueled conflict since 1962.  Had the intervening powers more directly shaped 
the permanent constitution, or had the negotiations taken place within the context of third-party 
negotiations, it is possible that the Tutsi dominance would have been more effectively reduced in 
the post-conflict political order. When left to domestic processes to resolve, however, the still 
powerful Tutsi were able to force concessions that maintained a significant degree of their 
power.  
Additionally, because the negotiations unfolded before conflict had ceased, the two most 
powerful rebel groups were kept outside of the negotiations process. When they were courted to 
join the negotiations, it was so late in the process that they declined to enter and demanded that 
the entire negotiations begin again. Here, failing to fully respond to the crisis by halting the 
violence (through forcible intervention if necessary) and entering into negotiations before 
ceasefires had been agreed upon and adhered to, created almost as many problems as ignoring 
root causes. Negotiating with some but not all of the parties to the conflict enabled the CNDD-
FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL to play the role of powerful spoilers, each of which had to be 
brought into the peace process through parallel but separate negotiations processes. This 
extended the life of the conflict by several years.  
 
Comparing the Negotiations Periods 
The first rounds of negotiations – those sponsored by the United Nations, the Carter Center, and 
the first few rounds of the Arusha talks – focused on crisis response. These talks each had a 
specific approach that distinguished them from each other. The UN-facilitated talks included 
only Frodebu and Uprona and aimed to resolve the crisis that began with the usurpation of the 
new government that had just been elected. The scope of these talks was limited to power 
sharing between the two principal political entities. The Carter Center talks occurred at a later 
stage, when the conflict erupted and multiple factions had gotten involved. This effort focused on 
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engaging regional countries and the government of Burundi, rather than bringing all the conflict 
parties to the table. The goals of these talks were to try to end the hostilities through a regional 
approach, rather than by directly mediating between the various parties in the conflict.  
The Arusha talks grew out of the regional process initiated by the Carter Center, and 
themselves went through various stages. The first stages, taking place between 1996 and May 
1999, attempted to create dialog between various warring factions and to establish an agenda for 
substantive discussions. These three attempts all shared a common goal: to end hostilities by 
getting parties to agree to a ceasefire. None of these talks attempted to address the issues that 
fueled the conflict; they focused on conflict termination and addressing some of the symptoms of 
the conflict (particularly refugees).  
In Burundi’s case, the conflict could never be sustainably managed, much less fully 
resolved, without unpacking the core issues that had fueled over 30 years of conflict. At the point 
where the negotiations should have turned to substantive issues, however, they encountered 
difficulties: many of the core issues that prompted conflict in the first place proved too difficult 
to process within the framework of externally-facilitated peace talks.98 When the Arusha talks 
split into five technical committees, each tasked with addressing a different set of issues, several 
of the committees were unable to agree on basic causes that should be addressed in the context of 
the discussion. Negotiators therefore utilized strategies that focused on technical arrangements 
and statements of principles, setting up subsequent structures that would process the substantive 
issues according to formula and principles established during the negotiations phases. 
 Postponing the fundamental issues to later stages did enable the negotiations processes to 
create peace agreements that parties to the conflict signed. In many respects the creation of the 
transitional government that subsequently created a permanent constitution, the core feature of 
the Arusha Accord, was a success. Arusha was an incomplete peace accord, however. Not 
including certain parties and processing important issues in the early agreements created a host 
of problems that have postponed the full resolution of the conflict. For one, the peace process 
had to undergo multiple additional rounds of side-negotiations and modifications parallel to and 
outside of the Arusha process. Thus the transitional government established by the Arusha 
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Accord had to be modified once the CNDD-FDD signed a ceasefire, and then these same 
provisions negotiated again – and with much delay and difficulty – once Palipehutu-FNL finally 
signed a ceasefire. Not only did this threaten the nascent government, which is a significant 
problem in and of itself, but the side-negotiations processes extended the life of the conflict and 
caused greater economic and human damage as a result.  
Second, the flawed peace agreement allowed signatories and non-signatories to reject it 
later on. Parties like the CNDD-FDD and some of the smaller Tutsi organizations were able to 
use the forced nature of the signing and the neglect of some key issue areas as political fodder in 
subsequent electoral campaigns: the CNDD-FDD was able to beat Frodebu in the 2005 elections 
in part because of the unpopularity of the Arusha Accord at the mass level.99  
Third, because the core document of the peace process left many critical issues 
unresolved, subsequent governments have been able to postpone action on important issues and 
problems, and certain issues, like the over-representation of Tutsi in the security sector, are still 
manifest. In 2006, six years post-Arusha and one year into the permanent government, 
Lemarchand noted that aside from provisions relating to democracy and governance and peace 
and security, most provisions in the Arusha agreement had yet to be implemented; there had been 
no progress on rewriting the country’s history and no moves to establish either a truth and 
reconciliation commission or the International Judicial Commission. Some provisions of the 
Arusha accord which were left at the statement of principles stage, like that of transitional 
justice, have only recently begun to be enacted by the Burundian government (since 2009).  
 
OUTCOMES AND BROADER LESSONS 
The positive outcomes cannot be denied. The political causes of the war – systematic 
disempowerment of the Hutu majority, the perception of threat felt by the Tutsi minority – seem 
to have been largely addressed since the transition to civilian government in 2005. Though the 
CNDD-FDD government showed early signs of autocratic behavior and intolerance of 
opposition, it has made great efforts to include significant Tutsi representation while also 
attending to the needs of Hutu. The consociational elements within the 2005 constitution force 
this compromise on the CNDD-FDD, but Reyntjens notes that Burundi seems to be de-
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politicizing the ethnic cleavage much more effectively than Rwanda, where the forced “ethnic 
amnesia” regime prevents the Hutu from discussing their own problems without being accused 
of “divisionism.”100 Burundi still needs to systematically empower Hutu and advance them in 
government structures and the country’s economy, but those processes are unfolding in the new 
regime. 
Reform of the security sector has also been steadily occurring since 2005, and with the 
demobilization of FNL fighters since January 2009 the character is changing once again. This 
addresses the second most fundamental set of causes – the Tutsification of the Burundian 
military and the security threat that creates for the Hutu majority. Tutsi are still over-represented 
in the security establishment, and this is a hangover from the negotiated nature of the settlement, 
but this was a necessary bargain to get to peace.  
 Ten years after the signing of the Arusha protocols Burundi is making steady progress in 
almost all sectors and addressing the core issues, even though they were not addressed during the 
peace negotiations. The military has been reformed to a large degree and the government now 
shares power between Hutu and Tutsi. In this respect, therefore, the analysis seems to indicate 
that core issues can still be addressed by subsequent processes if they are excluded from the 
negotiations process.  
 The tradeoff could be that leaving core issues to subsequent or separate processes 
prevents the issues from being fully addressed. In Burundi, the Tutsi are still over-represented in 
the military and government. Carrie Manning would argue that this is because Tutsi remained 
powerful throughout the negotiations process and the subsequent transitional period, and 
therefore were able to shape the post-conflict institutions to their advantage.101 Her work would 
imply that if the Tutsi had been disempowered through a stronger third-party intervention or 
mediation effort, or if the fundamental issues had not been processed by a transitional 
government that operated without external influence, they may not have been able to skew the 
permanent political and military institutions in their favor.  
 Getting to the point where fundamental root causes can be addressed may also take a lot 
longer if the these issues are not resolved – or even genuinely opened – during the negotiations 
phase. Certain issues may not be appropriate for mediation – those would include deep 
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socioeconomic inequalities like those generated by 30 years of anti-Hutu discriminatory policies. 
Those types of fundamental causes cannot be “mediated” away, but must be dealt with through 
steady and consistent government policy in the post-conflict period. Others, those that are more 
explicitly political, can be addressed through the negotiations process, but may not be due to 
political expediency. Yet as just discussed, allowing those to be resolved outside the lens of 
international mediation may empower the forces that created the problems in the first place. 
Ignoring key root causes because of political expediency or the opposition of negotiating 
partners can, and in the case of Burundi did, delay the attainment of a full peace settlement by 
requiring multiple side-negotiations and extending the life of the conflict.  
 The real issue is that the fundamental drivers of conflict most likely can never be 
genuinely addressed in the context of peace negotiations. The conflict is too recent, the parties 
too divided, and the issues too sensitive. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is a crisis 
response approach that effectively resolves the symptoms and creates room for bottom-up, 
peacebuilding processes that are supported by the international community. This in and of itself 
points to a significant policy conclusion: proactive engagement (an ounce of prevention) will go 
much farther in genuinely stabilizing conflict-prone African states than responding to conflicts 
that have already broken out. 
 Yet the debate is likely to continue anyway, and the policy community (both those who 
devise strategies and those who interpret and implement them) will be faced with the Faustian 
bargain: including extremely sensitive core issues may prevent progress in peace talks, but 
excluding those issues and focusing on process and crisis response issues creates a peace process 
with significant defects (like the “incomplete” Arusha protocol). These defects may be addressed 
through follow-on negotiations or transitional processes, which prevent them from completely 
derailing the peace process. If the short-term crisis response approach is the only one feasible 
when conflict erupts, then the international policy community will have to acknowledge that it is 
critical to remain engaged until the fundamental drivers are eventually addressed. Otherwise, 
sustainable peace may never occur.  
One last important item to note is that for Burundi, the external imposition of a peace 
process may have been the primary reason why the road to a stable settlement was beset by 
spoilers. Van Eck argues that the nature of the externally-facilitated negotiations in the 
Burundian peace process created these problems that continually delayed the full resolution of 
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conflict in Burundi. The external negotiators who actually created signable documents, 
particularly the South African delegations (whether led by Mandela, Zuma or Nqakula), focused 
so much on tight deadlines and timeframes that they forced parties to sign peace agreements 
without addressing substantive issues that motivated the movements.  
The practice of imposing agreements resulted in a virtual minefield of unresolved 
issues being left behind. While every party that signed against its wishes – from 
Arusha until today – was promised that it would be able to debate/negotiate its 
unresolved issues ‘once they sign and return to Burundi’ – this did not materialise. 
The feeling among these parties is that they were defeated and cheated, and the 
anger and frustration that this generates, actively contributes to tensions inside 
Burundi.102 
Khadiagala suggests that the Arusha Agreement served as the beginning of a confidence building 
process that eventually created a peaceful outcome, downplaying the criticism about the 
incompleteness of the peace accords. 103 Viewing the Arusha Accords as one part of a larger 
process of sequenced peace initiatives may be a useful lens to understanding how peace 
processes unfold over time. For the current analysis, however, the critical effect of Arusha was 
that excluding issues of central concern to militant groups motivated them to become spoilers. If 
root causes cannot be incorporated into peace negotiations at an early phase, and parties remain 
outside the negotiating and crisis response framework as a result, then the conflict is likely to 
extend until all spoilers are brought in.    
 
Broader Implications 
What are the wider implications of this analysis? Compared to other African conflicts where a 
resource logic warped an initial political struggle, the Burundian conflict seems relatively simple. 
The core issues fomenting conflict in 1993 were much the same as those generating tensions and 
massacres in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1991. That the Burundians were not able to resolve the issues 
points to the fact that they are not “easy” issues to resolve, but the stability of the issues allows 
an analysis of the complex process of peace negotiations that does not have to trace ever-
changing motivations for the actors. A similar exercise for the war in the Democratic Republic of 
                                                 
102 Van Eck, “Ongoing Search for a Durable Peace,” 6. Emphasis added.  
103 Khadiagala, Meddlers or Mediators?  
 53
Congo would have been much more complex, as the armed factions multiplied every time an 
armed group realized that there were substantial material gains to be made from the war 
enterprise in that mineral-rich country. 
The Burundi case therefore presents a stylized conflict, which simplifies the issues for 
analysis. Other conflicts in Africa will present even more divergence between root causes and 
the complex crises that present themselves at the time that negotiations to end conflicts begin. 
This means that the range of intervention strategies and policy options will vary more in many 
countries than in the Burundi case, where crisis response primarily meant seeking a ceasefire and 
bringing rebel groups into the political process. Where natural resource motivations enter into a 
conflict, or where the war economy inspires groups to maintain fighting, the motivations that 
keep groups fighting have to be addressed in addition to those that incited violence in the first 
place.  
In Liberia, for example, short-term crisis response strategies aimed at terminating conflict 
allocated certain key ministries to warlords who had become powerful during the course of the 
1990s war. This strategy was necessary to secure their buy in for a post-conflict settlement, and 
was a strategy designed to address a symptom produced by the dynamics of the conflict as it had 
evolved. At the same time, certain economic functions of the government were put under 
international control, even after a permanent domestic regime had been created. This was 
designed to address a root cause that had ignited conflict in the first place: poor management of 
economic resources by domestic elites.104 This dual approach provided more policy options for 
international actors. Burundi’s case shows, nonetheless, that even in a comparatively simple case 
there are significant impacts created by the different strategies that various third party 
peacemakers employ. Sometimes avoiding inclusion of root causes is necessary to generate 
discussion that moves forward, but the tradeoff is a prolonging of conflict and the necessity for 
supplemental processes to incorporate parties that defect due to the impartial nature of peace 
negotiations. 
For the policy community, this means that both aspects must be considered in every 
instance where third parties meddle in or attempt to help a conflict move towards resolution. The 
Burundi case points to a wider phenomenon in negotiated settlements: if the peace accords to not 
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address underlying causes, all they do is create a temporary cessation of conflict, and conflict is 
highly likely to break out again because the deep roots have not been addressed. In this sense, 
flawed peace accords can prevent the creation of peaceful settlements.  
This lesson suggests that short-term, crisis-response approaches may reduce or end 
hostilities in the short term but not the long term. Through this approach a conflict could be 
managed, but not settled. In the longer term the fundamental issues that drive conflict eventually 
have to be addressed, or else the conflict is likely to break out repeatedly. The short-term 
motivation of external actors may often lead to crisis response solutions. True conflict resolution, 
which addresses the drivers of conflicts, requires a more broad-based approach that integrates 
various policy instruments and agencies. What these instruments are (economic policy, social 
engineering, political assistance, military assistance, etc) will be dictated by the context of the 
particular conflict that is being addressed by the external actors.  
From a practical standpoint, however, the issue is not so simple. The Burundi case shows 
that root causes could not have been brought into the negotiating framework while the conflict 
was so fresh. The vested interests of the still-dominant Tutsi military and political elite would 
never have agreed to negotiations if certain issues were put on the table; and when those issues 
were incorporated the whole process stalled. From a policy perspective, therefore, addressing 
root causes may simply be infeasible once violent conflict has erupted or shortly after it has 
concluded.  
For one, there may be no capacity or political will to address root causes: international 
NGO actors may not have the resources to help deal with systemic root causes, while 
governments and intergovernmental organizations may lack the political will do to so. This is 
especially so when fundamental and long-term socioeconomic inequalities fomented conflict. 
Addressing political imbalances can be easier than socioeconomic: the lessons of institutional 
engineering are well known and readily applied. Support can be provided in the short to medium 
term without requiring long-term involvement by the international actors. In contrast, attempts to 
redress decades of skewed policies that provided educational, occupational and other advantages 
to certain segments of a population would take years to decades to implement. Similarly, 
rebuilding national militaries is a significant commitment in terms of time and resources. The 
peace negotiations process most likely is not the appropriate venue to devise socioeconomic 
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policies, nor can the international community truly serve as the appropriate actor to implement 
redistributive policies of this nature.  
International actors could show commitment during the negotiations periods that they 
will remain committed to help the country deal with these deeper issues. Not all may wish to 
play this role, but it is often important to push countries to tackle difficult problems later on. 
International actors could also aid parties to discuss the problems that future processes need to 
address. Here the difference between Nelson Mandela’s and Julius Nyerere’s approaches to the 
Burundian negotiations becomes important: while Mandela’s approach could be faulted for many 
things, he did force the Burundians to begin to frankly discuss the problems between the two 
main ethnic groups. This is not all that is necessary to address the deep divisions, but Mandela 
was able to at least start the dialog. Without that, it is possible that the Burundian parties would 
have continued to discuss their issues through euphemisms and allegorical references, rather than 
through direct and frank confrontation of some of the deeper root causes. If the conversation is 
initiated during the negotiations phase, it is more likely to be continued afterwards.  
The importance placed on resolving the drivers of conflicts should not detract from the 
necessity of crisis response. The Burundi case demonstrated clear drawbacks tied to the fact that 
the parties entered into negotiations while still waging armed combat. Because the peace talks 
began before hostilities had halted, parties were able to use violence to influence the talks. Other 
complex symptoms, such as repatriating the large refugee populations that had built up over 30 
years of conflict, continued to challenge the peace process well past the transitional phase.  
Additionally, the Burundi case shows that the ways that the issues driving conflict are 
addressed is critical. Had the ownership principle of peace negotiations not been violated and the 
timetable not forced on the participants, the Arusha process might have generated more 
participation from the rebel movements, and the resultant agreement may have generated broader 
acceptance and legitimacy.105 For planners at USAFRICOM and other groups in the foreign 
policy community engaged in Africa (and possibly elsewhere), perhaps the most base lesson 
from this analysis is to build support from the ground-up, rather than initiating a top-down 
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process and hoping for buy-in later on. Legitimacy and acceptance, once lost, is very difficult to 
generate.  
 This suggests a phased approach: external actors may become involved to end hostilities, 
but if they do not embed crisis response within a longer-term conflict resolution process then the 
conflict may heat up again. For the United States in particular, this means that short-term 
mechanisms that focus on state level security and conflict reduction, especially those that 
increase the capacity of African militaries, may achieve short-term results without long-term 
increases in safety and stability.  If the military itself is compromised, as it is in many countries 
like Burundi where governments actively repress segments of their populations, providing 
assistance to the military may create even more problems.  
 Initial efforts to address a conflict may have to focus on the military aspects: 
interventions to halt violent conflict and initiate peace processes. These efforts, however, must 
unfold in the context of a broader strategy that aims to address the fundamental human security 
issues that drive conflict in the first place. Otherwise, the international actors will be drawn in for 
additional intervention and negotiations when conflicts erupt in the future. This speaks to the 
“whole of government” approach that has become the catch phrase in United States foreign 
policy in recent years.  
Military solutions alone cannot address conflicts when individual security concerns and 
system inequalities have fomented the violence. As Chester Crocker noted, intervention is not 
just about military interventions, and there are a range of non-military options that that factor 
into the response to a conflict. Timing and sequencing are important, as is the link between force 
and diplomacy. The Burundi example seems to support Crocker’s suggestions that the wide 
range of diplomatic, economic and military tools be brought to bear when designing intervention 
strategies and sequencing efforts by different actors in the foreign policy arena.106 Different tiers 
of conflict can be best addressed by specific actors: intervention to stop fighting; demobilization 
to disarm and repatriate combatants; diplomatic efforts to initiate and propel negotiations 
processes; economic support packages to aid reconstruction and address structural imbalances, 
and political advisors to assist in political and institution building.  
 
106 Chester A. Crocker, “Intervention: Towards Best Practices and a Holistic View,” in Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall 
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APPENDIX THREE: PEACE AND CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS 
 
August 2000 – Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi – 19 signatories, no 
CNDD-FDD or Palipehutu-FNL (Arusha Accord) 
October 2002  - Ceasefire with two small Hutu rebel groups 
November 2003 – Global Ceasefire Agreement; between the Transitional Government of 
Burundi and the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza wing) 
June 2006 – Agreement on Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability in Burundi; 
between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL  (Shorthand: FNL-CFA, 
FNL Cease Fire Agreement) 
September 7, 2006 Ceasefire Agreement with Palipehutu-FNL 
May 26, 2008 – reaffirmation of the FNL-CFA 
 
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi Signatories 
1. The Government of the Republic of Burundi, 
2. The National Assembly, 
3. The Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut (ABASA), G-10 
4. The Alliance Nationale pour le Droit et le Développement (ANADDE), G-10 
5. The Alliance des Vaillants (AV-INTWARI), G-10 
6. The Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD), G-7 
7. The Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), G-7 
8. The Front pour la Libération Nationale (FROLINA), G-7 
9. The Parti Socialiste et Panafricaniste (INKINZO), G-10 
10. The Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), G-7 
11. The Parti pour le Redressement National (PARENA), G-10 
12. The Parti Indépendant des Travailleurs (PIT),G-10 
13. The Parti Libéral (PL), G-10 
14. The Parti du Peuple (PP), G-7 
15. The Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple (PRP), G-10 
16. The Parti Social-Démocrate (PSD), G-7 
17. The Ralliement pour la Démocratie et le Développement Economique et Social 
(RADDES), G-10 
18. The Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais (RPB), G-7 
19. The Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA), G-10 
 
(G-10 are pro-Tutsi groupings ; G-7 are pro-Hutu movements. These were two of the 
three camps established during the Mandela phase of the negotiations. The third camp 





APPENDIX FOUR: COUPS AND COUP ATTEMPTS 
 
Successful Coups 
1966 → Captain Michel Micombero 
1976 → Lt. Col. Jean Baptiste Bagaza 
1987→ Major Pierre Buyoya 
1996 → Pierre Buyoya 
 
Unsuccessful Coup Attempts and Plots 
October 1965 – Hutu politicians and gendarmerie 
September 1969 – suspected plot by Muramvya faction 
April 1972 – Hutu uprising 
March 1989 – by Bagaza faction of military 
March 1992 – Tutsi hardliners 
July 1993 – Tutsi military hardliners 
October 1993 – Frodebu uprising 
April 2001 
July 2001 – uncovered coup plot, foiled 
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